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THE IMF MUST DEVELOP BEST PRACTICES BEFORE 
GOVERNMENT-BACKED CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
DESTABILIZE THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following hypothetical—Russia, under economic sanctions 
from the West (i.e., the Western Bloc, including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, etc.) which bar consumers from conducting 
business with Russian corporations, introduces a government-backed 
cryptocurrency (“the e-Ruble”), accessible to all members of the European 
continent, both European Union (EU) members and non-members.1 Russian 
corporations, hoping to re-enter the European markets, propose their customers 
use this Russian-backed cryptocurrency to circumvent the sanctions.  
European citizens, seeing the benefits of the e-Ruble—particularly its cross-
border reach and lower transaction fees—begin using this Russian-backed 
cryptocurrency, increasing demand for the e-Ruble and weakening the Euro.2 
Furthermore, China, in an economic alliance with Russia, permits Chinese 
corporations to conduct business using the e-Ruble.3 European consumers and 
businesses, now allowed to use the e-Ruble in two of the largest export markets 
and six of the largest eleven world economies, further weaken by lowering its 
demand.4 
 
 1 This is not a far-off hypothetical; the potential for this scenario is very real. See Anthony Cuthbertson, 
Iran Plans National Cryptocurrency to Evade U.S. Sanctions, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www. 
independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/iran-national-cryptocurrency-us-sanctionsbitcoin-trump-
a8512596.html; Max Seddon & Martin Arnold, Putin Considers ‘Cryptorouble’ as Moscow Seeks to Evade 
Sanctions, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/54d026d8-e4cc-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da? 
segmentId=6132a895-e068-7ddc-4cec-a1abfa5c8378. 
 2 For the purposes of this hypothetical, Russian exports of natural gas, oil, minerals, and certain 
manufactured goods to Europe are significant. As such, European consumers and businesses are dependent on 
Russian imports as Russia is not under economic sanctions from the EU. See Russia, U.S. ENERGY ADMIN. (Mar. 
12, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20140324135804/http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=rs; see 
also EU Imports of Energy Products—Recent Developments, EUROSTAT (May 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/ 
eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/46126.pdf (“Special focus is given to Russia as the main supplier of 
petroleum oils and natural gas to the EU.”). 
 3 We assume China is working on its own cryptocurrency, but, for now, permits Chinese corporations to 
use the e-Ruble. See, e.g., Emily Feng, Facebook’s Digital Money Plan Raises Stakes for China’s 
Cryptocurrency Ambitions, NPR (July 31, 2019, 8:46AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/31/742223881/ 
facebooks-digital-money-plan-raises-stakes-for-china-s-cryptocurrency-ambitions. 
 4 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2018, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2019). 
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Seeking revenge on the EU, and the West more broadly, for previously 
imposed economic sanctions, Russia initiates a speculative attack on the Euro.5 
In an attempt to ensure EU citizens have a stable, sovereign currency not under 
Russia’s control, the EU rushes to adopt its own “e-Euro,” which has similar 
characteristics to the e-Ruble. Reminded of the Cold War, the EU also urges the 
United States to adopt its own government-backed cryptocurrency, sensing that 
this could be the next front of attack for Russia. These actions spur reactionary 
measures by both developed and developing countries,6 and soon after, the world 
is fighting through currency manipulation. The front for the war is government-
backed cryptocurrencies and there is no established framework for oversight, 
nor is there an international organization capable of containing the “fighting” or 
its national and international consequences. The near constant currency 
manipulation, amid global adoption of government-backed cryptocurrency, 
results in the collapse of the international monetary system, setting the globe 
back nearly eighty years. 
While this scenario may seem far-fetched, the characteristics of 
cryptocurrency make it a distinct possibility.7 Cryptocurrencies, and the 
technology underlying them, are promising technological advancements.8 
However, some of the characteristics that make the technology so promising are 
also the characteristics which could lead to a minor problem spiraling out of 
control. Government-backed cryptocurrency poses a threat to the stability of the 
international monetary system and, barring rapid and proactive measures, the 
international community risks sustaining significant injury to the infrastructure 
of the international economy. 
 
 5 See Ed Howden, Comment, The Crypto-Currency Conundrum: Regulating an Uncertain Future, 29 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 741, 773 (2015) (“A speculative attack is considered a massive devaluation of a country’s 
currency brought on by the selling of the country’s currency.”). 
 6 This is described as the “Herding Effect.” See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 7 See discussion infra Part III.B.  
 8 See generally, Michael Crosby et al., BlockChain Technology: Beyond Bitcoin, 2016 APPLIED 
INNOVATION REV. (discussing cryptocurrencies). 
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Cryptocurrency9 is the flavor of the month (or decade), and the darling of 
Silicon Valley, Wall Street, and Main Street.10 But it is not all sunshine and 
rainbows; the volatility of Bitcoin, and other cryptos, has been covered ad-
nauseum.11 While “cryptocurrency” often evokes worries of “price volatility,” 
this is not the biggest threat posed by cryptocurrency.12 Cryptocurrencies, 
specifically government-backed cryptocurrencies,13 present a threat to the 
stability of the international monetary and financial systems.14  
 
 9 “Governments around the world are taking different approaches to cryptocurrency, applying different 
nomenclatures and definitions.” Hearing on Examining Regulatory Frameworks for Digital Currencies and 
Blockchain Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. 4 (July 30, 2019) 
(statement of Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance). Among the most commonly 
used terminology are “digital currency,” “virtual currency,” “virtual commodity,” “virtual asset,” “electronic 
currency,” and “payment token.” GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY AROUND THE 
WORLD 1 (June 2018) [hereinafter GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD]. While there is other common 
vocabulary associated with cryptocurrencies, the idea here is to hopefully avoid confusing many different 
concepts with each other, an example of which would be “utility tokens.” Id. at 78. 
 10 See generally, Libra White Paper, LIBRA (July 23, 2019), https://libra.org/en-US/white-paper/ 
(discussing plans for cryptocurrency); Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-
2017-12-11 (showing Wall Street and Main Street Interest); see also, e.g., Steve Fiorillo, Bitcoin History: 
Timeline, Origins and Founder, THESTREET (Aug. 17, 2018, 1:27 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/ 
bitcoin/bitcoin-history-14686578; Matthew Braga, As Merchants Embrace Bitcoin, Digital Currency Still 
Struggles for Regulatory Approval Worldwide, FIN. POST (Jan. 20, 2014), http://business.financialpost.com/ 
2014/01/20/bitcoin-currency-merchants-regulators-2014/?lsa=592b-fc15.  
 11 See, e.g., Scott A. Wiseman, Note, Property or Currency? The Tax Dilemma Behind Bitcoin, 2016 
UTAH L. REV. 417, 424 (2016); Nicholas A. Plassaras, Comment, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing 
Bitcoin within the Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 377, 380–81 (2013); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An 
Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 164–65 (2012); Nikolei M. 
Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 127–28 (2012). 
 12 JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS, 17–18 (2013); see also 
Timothy B. Lee, An Illustrated History of Bitcoin Crashes, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2013, 12:45 AM), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2013/04/11/an-illustrated-history-of-bitcoin-crashes/; Aleksander Berentsen & 
Fabian Schär, A Short Introduction to the World of Cryptocurrencies, 100 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 1, 14 
(2018). 
 13 Over the last twenty-five years, many scholarly articles have discussed different forms of central bank 
e-money or Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), including various potential characteristics of such central 
bank currency. See, e.g., Charles M. Kahn et al., Should the Central Bank Issue E-money?, (Bank of Can., Staff 
Working Paper No. 2018-58, 2018). While articles discussing CBDC and central bank e-money will provide a 
basis for much of the analysis here, such general terms also include digital currency, released by central banks 
or governments in a variety of forms, many of which do not rely on cryptography. See id. at 3 (“Our definition 
of central bank e-money is an electronic liability of the central bank, which might be held as a token or in an 
account.”). This Comment will focus primarily on government-backed cryptocurrency, which would be initially 
released by central banks or governments, but would rely on cryptography, Distributed Ledger Technology, and 
blockchain. This focus more seamlessly permits extrapolation of lessons learned from regulation of private 
cryptocurrency. See generally id. 
 14 EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS 26 (Feb. 2015) 
[hereinafter ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS]. 
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Governments have been slow,15 ineffective,16 and inconsistent in 
implementing regulatory responses to private cryptocurrencies.17 As of May 
2019, governments have managed to avoid such dangers, primarily because 
private cryptocurrencies18 are not yet of significant enough heft to destabilize 
the entire international monetary system.19 However, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) posits that, “[t]he build-up of financial stability risks from [Virtual 
Currency Schemes (VCS)] would be likely under the following conditions: (i) 
VCS become more widely used in regular payments; (ii) greater links to the real 
economy develop, including through the presence of financial institutions 
participating in VCS … ”20 
The biggest concern for government-backed cryptocurrencies is the potential 
instability within the international economy and monetary system.21 Moving 
forward, more countries will dip their toes into the waters, choosing either to 
adopt their own, or another country’s government-backed cryptocurrency.22 And 
while the international community has so far managed to avoid catastrophe, 
government-backed cryptocurrencies pose a greater threat to the stability of the 
international monetary system than do private cryptocurrencies.23 Government-
backed cryptocurrencies have the potential to become fully integrated within the 
 
 15 See Braga, supra note 10; Bob Adelmann, Government Is Taking Steps to Regulate Bitcoin, NEW AM. 
(Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/sectors/item/16985-government-is-taking-steps-
to-regulate-bitcoin; Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin 
Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 296–306 (2015). 
 16 See Anton Didenko & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of Currency: Cash to Cryptos to Sovereign 
Digital Currency, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. (forthcoming Jan. 2019) (“In the case of Bitcoin and its spin-offs, 
regulation has proven distinctly problematic for technical reasons: without a central server or a single operator, 
it has been rather difficult to identify those to whom regulation should apply … Instead, the most popular 
regulatory measure has taken the form of warnings concerning potential risks and—ironically—lack of proper 
regulation. As the new privately issued digital currencies have kept multiplying, it was perhaps only a matter of 
time before regulators would devise new strategies where regulation had thus far proven ineffective.”). 
 17 See generally GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR. AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9 (surveying the approach to 
regulation of private cryptocurrencies of 130 jurisdictions, with a wide swath of approaches being undertaken). 
 18 While not a widely used term, “private cryptocurrencies,” for purposes of this Comment, will refer to 
those cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, and Ripple, so as to distinguish such cryptocurrencies from what 
will be referred to as “government-backed cryptocurrencies.” 
 19 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 20 ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 26. 
 21 Veronika Rinecker, Gov’t-Issued Digital Currencies Threaten Financial Stability, Says Swiss Central 
Banker, COIN TELEGRAPH (Apr. 9, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/govt-issued-digital-currencies-
threaten-financial-stability-says-swiss-central-banker; see also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, ANNUAL 
ECONOMIC REPORT 100–01 (2018). 
 22 Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16, at 52–53 (positing that while there may be hesitation on the part 
of most nations in leaping into the unknown with respect to government-backed cryptocurrency, should a major 
economy adopt such an official currency, other nations know they must respond in-kind). 
 23 See discussion infra Part II.B.; see also discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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international monetary system.24 This integration, combined with the lack of 
oversight or system of best practices, governments and international 
organizations ought to be acting with more urgency.25 Governments should 
prioritize development of mechanisms to counter potential instability posed by 
widespread adoption of government-backed cryptocurrency. Stability risks to 
international systems are one of the most pressing issues facing governments 
and governance organizations around the world.26  
How should the global community address this concern of potential 
instability posed by government-backed cryptocurrency? Is there one specific 
organization which ought to “take the wheel” in coordinating a best practices 
regime for government-backed cryptocurrency? Or is the current system, one in 
which each country sets their own oversight framework, the best way to deal 
with the potential instability posed by government-backed cryptocurrency to the 
international monetary system?  
Development of a cohesive and consistent international standard for best 
practices will allow government-backed cryptocurrency to flourish, while 
limiting the potential dangers posed to the international monetary system. The 
organization best-equipped to handle international oversight of government-
backed cryptocurrencies is the International Monetary Fund (IMF).27 The IMF 
can provide protection to consumers, investors, and states by providing 
legitimacy to these government-backed cryptocurrencies and by helping the 
international community deal with the risks associated.28  
This Comment justifies, in the context of private cryptocurrency regulatory 
schemes, IMF leadership in developing an international framework of “best 
practices” and proposes the IMF “pick up the pace” in creating such an oversight 
framework.  
 
 24 Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, et al., Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currency, 2018 IMF Staff 
Discussion Note 18/08, 27. 
 25 See ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14. 
 26 As the ECB states, if virtual currency schemes become more widely adopted and are more directly 
connected to the financial system, threats to financial stability will need to be addressed. Id. at 26 (“[A]s and 
when these conditions are met to a larger extent, more direct regulatory responses might be required from 
a financial stability perspective.”). 
 27 See Plassaras, supra note 11, at 395–96 (discussing the primary purpose for the IMF and its role in the 
global system of international exchange); see generally The IMF at a Glance, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Aug. 22, 
2012), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm. The IMF was created primarily to: (1) “overcome 
the collective action problem of allowing individual countries to enact self-interested economic policies without 
jeopardizing the global economy” and (2) “ensure the stability of the international monetary system.” Plassaras, 
supra note 11, at 393. 
 28 See Plassaras, supra note 11, at 404. 
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Given that development of government-backed cryptocurrency is seemingly 
in the initial stages, there are few real-life examples from which to draw upon.29 
This Comment will look to the international regulatory treatment of private 
cryptocurrencies, primarily using Bitcoin as an example, and evaluate the 
approach that might best translate to oversight of government-backed 
cryptocurrencies. However, this Comment will not assess the effectiveness of 
current regulatory schemes in regulating private cryptocurrencies, nor proffer a 
suggestion for which regulatory scheme best fits private cryptocurrencies. In 
addition, this Comment will not address the potential implications of 
government-backed cryptocurrencies for the future of private cryptocurrencies. 
This Comment will begin in Part I by looking at the recent, widespread 
interest in government-backed cryptocurrencies. Part I will also discuss the 
threat posed to the stability of the international monetary system and the 
existence of a framework (or lack-thereof) for oversight of government-backed 
cryptocurrencies.  
In Part II, this Comment will discuss private cryptocurrencies, focusing 
specifically on Bitcoin, its characteristics, and the various regulatory schemes 
currently in place around the world. Private cryptocurrencies do not fit neatly 
into any one classification of regulated good.30 Examining the various 
approaches to regulation of private cryptocurrency will help to determine 
whether a parallel oversight framework can be applied to government-backed 
cryptocurrencies.  
In Part III, this Comment will identify the differences between private 
cryptocurrencies and government cryptocurrencies, in an effort to identify which 
limitation, or limitations, ought to be of primary concern.  
In Part IV, this Comment will look to the global response to private cryptos 
to provide some insight on how an oversight framework for government-backed 
cryptocurrency might be devised. This Comment will then parse through the 
globe’s stumbling attempts to regulate private cryptocurrencies,31 in hopes of 
finding a solution to deal with the potential instability posed by the proliferation 
of government-backed cryptocurrencies.  
 
 29 See infra Part V. 
 30 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 31 See, e.g., Carol R. Goforth, U.S. Law: Crypto is Money, Property, a Commodity, and a Security, All at 
the Same Time, J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION (forthcoming Oct. 2018) (discussing the overlapping regulatory 
regimes and the unclear nature of what cryptocurrencies ought to be considered). 
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Finally, this Comment will propose that the IMF take on efforts of 
coordinating an international standard for best practices with greater urgency. 
By proposing that such coordination and oversight fall under the purview of the 
IMF, the international community can preemptively address one of the major 
dangers arising from widespread adoption of government-backed 
cryptocurrencies.  
I. INCREASED GOVERNMENT INTEREST  
The dam is about to break in terms of widespread adoption of government-
backed cryptocurrencies.32 In August 2018, Venezuela launched the Petro, 
garnering media attention across the globe.33 It seemed to be a clear attempt to 
capitalize on the “crypto-craze,” spurred by Bitcoin’s meteoric rise since early 
2017.34 However, many investment analysts have been quick to criticize the 
Petro as a clear scam.35 On the other hand, Sweden, Japan, and Estonia have all 
contemplated the idea of releasing their own, more legitimate 
cryptocurrencies.36  
When Bitcoin first emerged into the mainstream, only a few countries (e.g., 
Brazil,37 Germany,38 and Canada39) were receptive to the idea of decentralized 
 
 32 See Qin Chen, Next Stop in the Cryptocurrency Craze: A Government-backed Coin, CNBC (Nov. 30, 
2017, 8:41 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/30/cryptocurrency-craze-springboards-government-backed-
coin.html; David Tweed, Why Governments Might Join the Cryptocurrency Craze, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-12/why-governments-might-join-the-cryptocurrency-craze-
quicktake; see also Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Winds of Change: The Case for 
New Digital Currency, Address at the Singapore Fintech Festival 7 (Nov. 14, 2018). 
 33 See, e.g., Kate Rooney, Venezuela Is Pegging Its Economic Recovery to a Cryptocurrency That’s 
Widely Considered a Scam, CNBC (Aug. 20, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/20/venezuela-
is-pegging-its-economic-recovery-to-a-cryptocurrency—thats-widely-considered-a-scam.html. 
 34 Chen, supra note 32; see also Hilary Hosia & Nick Perry, This Is the First Country to Adopt a 
Cryptocurrency As Its Official Currency, TIME (Mar. 5, 2018), http://time.com/money/5186316/this-is-the-first-
country-to-adopt-a-cryptocurrency-as-its-official-currency/ (“Bank of England Governor Mark Carney said this 
past week that a global speculative mania had encouraged a proliferation of the currencies …. ‘[t]he prices of 
many cryptocurrencies have exhibited the classic hallmarks of bubbles … reliant in part on finding the greater 
fool.’”). 
 35 See, e.g., Rooney, supra note 33; George Richards, Why Governments Are Building Their Own 
Cryptocurrencies, RACONTEUR (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.raconteur.net/finance/governments-building-
cryptocurrencies. 
 36 Chen, supra note 32. 
 37 Judith Lee et al., Bitcoin Basics: A Primer on Virtual Currencies, 16 BLI 21 (Jan. 2015). 
 38 Emily Spaven, Germany Officially Recognizes Bitcoin as “Private Coin,” COINDESK (Aug. 19, 2013), 
https://www.coindesk.com/germany-official-recognises-bitcoin-as-private-money/. 
 39 See Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating 
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 530–32 (2015) (citing Proceeds of Crime 
(Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c 17, amended by S.C. 2014, c C-31 (Can.)). 
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cryptocurrencies. Many were outright hostile (e.g., China40 and Thailand41), 
while others merely waited for further developments.42 This attitude has shifted 
drastically in the past four to five years.43 As of December 2018, a number of 
governments,44 including Estonia,45 Japan,46 and the United States,47 have 
expressed at least an interest in releasing their own, government-backed 
cryptocurrencies. Other governments have gone farther, with some undertaking 
research in anticipation of a release in the near future (e.g., Canada,48 Sweden49), 
while others have already issued their own versions (e.g., Tunisia,50 Senegal,51 
Dubai,52 the Marshall Islands,53 and Venezuela54). 
Government interest in entering the cryptocurrency arena is motivated by a 
number of factors, but is driven primarily by expected benefits such as lower 
 
 40 REUTERS, China is Shutting Down All of Beijing’s Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Exchanges, FORTUNE 
(Sept. 15, 2017, 8:21 AM), http://fortune.com/2017/09/15/china-shutting-down-beijing-bitcoin-cryptocurrency-
exchanges/; see also Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 512 (citing Virtual Currencies: International 
Actions and Regulations, PERKINS COIE, http:// www.perkinscoie.com/virtual-currencies-international-actions-
and-regulations (last updated June 2015)). 
 41 Virtual Currencies: International Actions and Regulations, PERKINS COIE, http://www.perkinscoie. 
com/virtual-currencies-international-actions-and-regulations (last updated May 2019). 
 42 See GLOB. LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., REGULATION OF BITCOIN IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS 1 (Jan. 2014) 
[hereinafter GLOB. LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., SELECTED JURISDICTIONS] (“Of those countries surveyed, only a 
few, notably China and Brazil, have specific regulations applicable to bitcoin use … [T]he debate over how to 
deal with this new virtual currency is still in its infancy.”). 
 43 Compare id. (analyzing cryptocurrency regulation in forty select jurisdictions in 2014), with GLOB. 
LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD., supra note 9 (analyzing government regulations of cryptocurrencies 
in 130 jurisdictions in 2018). 
 44 See Mancini-Griffoli, et al., supra note 24, ¶ 54 (listing Australia, Brazil, China, Norway, Uruguay, 
Canada, Curacao, Ecuador, Israel, United Kingdom, and the Philippines, among others, as countries that have 
expressed interest in government-backed cryptocurrency). 
 45 Chen, supra note 32. 
 46 Arjun Kharpal, Japanese Banks are Thinking of Making Their Own Cryptocurrency Called the J-Coin, 
CNBC (Sept. 27, 2017, 9:04 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/27/japanese-banks-cryptocurrency-j-coin. 
html. 
 47 Jeff Cox, Federal Reserve Starting to Think About Its Own Digital Currency, Dudley Says, CNBC 
(Nov. 29, 2017, 8:52 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/federal-reserve-starting-to-think-about-its-own-
digital-currency-dudley-says.html. 
 48 See generally, Walter Engert & Ben S. C. Fung, Central Bank Digital Currency: Motivations and 
Implications (Bank of Can. Staff Discussion Paper 2017-16, 2017). 
 49 SVERIGES RIKSBANK, THE RIKSBANK’S E-KRONA PROJECT: REPORT 1 (Sept. 2017). 
 50 Stephen O’Neal, State-Issued Digital Currencies: The Countries Which Adopted, Rejected or 
Researched the Concept, COIN TELEGRAPH (July 19, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/state-issued-digital-
currencies-the-countries-which-adopted-rejected-or-researched-the-concept. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Samburaj Das, emCash is Dubai’s First Official State Cryptocurrency, CCN (Oct. 3, 2017, 1:57 PM), 
https://www.ccn.com/emcash-dubais-first-official-state-cryptocurrency/. 
 53 Hosia & Perry, supra note 34. 
 54 Rooney, supra note 33. 
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transaction costs,55 the potential for further financial inclusion,56 and the secure 
“public ledger.”57 At the same time, governments have made it clear for years 
that a move towards digital is near, given the global environment and shifting 
attitude away from physical cash.58 Finally, one of the likely59 driving forces 
behind the interest in government-backed cryptocurrencies is the extensive news 
coverage of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.60 
A. Greater Financial Inclusion Means More Extensive Integration of 
Government-backed Crypto Into the International Monetary System 
Governments considering adoption of government-backed cryptocurrency 
frequently cite the potential that such technology provides for greater financial 
inclusion.61 Lower transaction costs are a significant contributing factor in 
government-backed cryptocurrencies’ potential for financial inclusion.62 
Another contributing factor is the implicit trust associated with a medium of 
exchange backed by the government/central bank.63 Finally, elimination of the 
requirement for a trusted third-party intermediary not only contributes to lower 
 
 55 EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, 21 (Oct. 2012), [hereinafter ECB, VIRTUAL 
CURRENCY SCHEMES] (“[T]ransactions are carried out faster and more cheaply than with traditional means of 
payment. Transactions fees, if any, are very low and no bank account fee is charged.”). 
 56 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 57 Jason Abbruzzese, What Happens When Governments Get into Cryptocurrency, MASHABLE (Jan. 8, 
2018), https://mashable.com/2018/01/08/cryptocurrency-bitcoin-governments/#YjtOaApmjaq4. 
 58 See IMF, Republic of the Marshall Islands: 2018 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Rep. No. 
18/270 (Sept. 2018) [hereinafter Republic of the Marshall Islands]; SVERIGES RIKSBANK, supra note 49; 
Lagarde, supra note 32 (“[M]oney itself is changing. We expect it to become more convenient and user-friendly, 
perhaps even less serious-looking. We expect it to be integrated with social media, readily available for online 
and person-to-person use, including micro-payments.”). 
 59 It seems prescient to note that this is my own opinion. The applications of blockchain technology 
beyond Bitcoin are plentiful and diverse, as outlined in numerous articles. See, e.g., Crosby, supra note 8. 
However, cryptocurrencies have captured most of the attention of news outlets and the average consumer. 
Charles Bovaird, Top 5 Factors Driving Bitcoin Higher This Year, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2017, 4:37 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cbovaird/2017/12/22/top-5-factors-driving-bitcoin-higher-this-
year/#2d3d685461a9. Governments have latched onto this enthusiasm and put forth proposals centered primarily 
on cryptocurrencies, as opposed to proposals focused on the other aspects of the underlying technology. See, 
e.g., Token Taxonomy Act, H.R. 2144, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 60 Bovaird, supra note 59. 
 61 See Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, at Table 2 (indicating that many countries considering the 
implementation of CBDC reason that it will lead to greater financial inclusion); Lagarde, supra note 32 (“Let 
me start with financial inclusion, where digital currency offers great promise, through its ability to reach people 
and businesses in remote and marginalized regions.”). 
 62 This includes distributed ledger technology (DLT) and blockchain technology. For further discussion 
of these technologies, see Crosby, supra note 8. 
 63 See Plassaras, supra note 11, 383 n. 25 (2013) (citing ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, supra note 
55, at 9–10) (“Users are willing to accept it in exchange for goods and services simply because they trust this 
central authority.). 
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transaction fees (meaning greater financial inclusion),64 but also allows 
consumers to take one fewer step to enter the “mainstream” structured financial 
system.65 
Potential risks to the international financial system must be addressed in a 
proactive manner, especially in light of the expectation that government-backed 
cryptocurrency will lead to greater financial inclusion.66 Greater financial 
integration will allow such government-backed digital currency to account for 
substantially more of the value of the international monetary system.67 As 
government-backed cryptocurrency comes to represent a greater portion of the 
international monetary system, potential instability will become more pressing 
and represent a bigger risk to the international monetary system.68 The 
international community must deal with the risks associated with such 
integration before they present a major problem. 
B. The Threat to Stability 
Due to the cross-border reach of cryptocurrencies, “the actions of one 
country that buys and sells cryptocurrency to control its availability could have 
a destabilizing effect on other economies that also widely use that 
cryptocurrency; in this way, one country’s approach to cryptocurrency could 
undermine price stability or exacerbate recessions or overheating in another 
country.”69 Other risks to financial stability are posed by widely-adopted digital 
currency.70 Per the IMF themselves, there are at least two scenarios which need 
to be considered as dangers to the stability of the financial system (1) “Risk of 
Disintermediation in Tranquil Times,” and (2) “Run Risks in Times of 
Systematic Financial Stress.”71 Such effects are only increased when there is 
 
 64 Brito, supra note 12, at 10–13.  
 65 See Joshua J. Doguet, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin 
Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1122 (2013) (“While third parties, like central banks and financial 
intermediaries, often perform valuable services in regulating and transferring currency, their presence in the 
system increases the cost of using it …. In this context, cost is used in a broad sense not only to include the 
increased financial expense of the system, but also the inconvenience and uncertainty that it entails.”). 
 66 See, e.g., Lagarde, supra note 32 (discussing that part of the case for central bank digital currency is 
the potential for greater financial inclusion of people and businesses in remote and marginalized regions); 
Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, at Table 2 (indicating that many countries considering the implementation 
of CBDC reason that it will lead to greater financial inclusion). 
 67 See hypothetical supra Part I. 
 68 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 69 David W. Perkins, Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues, 
Congressional Research Service 22 (Dec. 7, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45427.pdf. 
 70 See Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶¶ 38–50 (discussing the potential effect CBDC could have 
on financial stability in a domestic context). 
 71 Id.; see also Lagarde, supra note 32 (discussing the downsides of “Bank Digital Currencies,” including 
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further integration of government-backed cryptocurrencies into the monetary 
system.  
Financial instability within the system could also begin with a speculative 
attack on the value of a currency.72 Speculative attacks can be undertaken by 
international actors, for a number of purposes, but if successful, such attacks 
would cause substantial instability within the international monetary system.73 
One purpose of the IMF is to help counter such speculative attacks if needed, by 
fluctuating the money supply.74  
Hidden in the background is one of the biggest threats to stability—the 
“Herding Effect.”75 The premise of the “Herding Effect” is that if one 
government-backed cryptocurrency becomes the dominant form of electronic 
payment, other countries will want to “get in on the action.”76 Governments that 
fail to develop the technology quickly will risk the loss of “monetary 
sovereignty,” something of vital importance to the legitimacy of government 
itself.77 
C. The Lack of International Response  
The response of regulators, commentators, and investors to the proposition 
of government-backed cryptocurrency has been a mix of curiosity and 
 
the potential risks to financial stability presented by pressure on bank deposits and the possibility of bank runs). 
 72 For an in-depth discussion of these potential speculative attacks in the context of Bitcoin, see Nicholas 
A. Plassaras, supra note 11, at 377. While Plassaras’ discussion is in the context of Bitcoin, “[a]ny other digital 
currency that enters widespread use would pose similar problems.” Id. at 380. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16, at 52–53 
 76 “[O]ne of the biggest possible challenges stems from the herding effect that may result from the 
adoption of a disintermediated state-backed official currency by a major economy, like the US. The utility of an 
official medium of exchange digitally available to end-users without any intermediaries is hard to overestimate—
such a currency could quickly become a dominant medium of exchange in international transactions, without 
meaningful ways for other states to regulate it, since the underlying technology easily penetrates national 
boundaries. One possible response for other states in this scenario could be the development of their own 
competing sovereign digital currencies and their promotion for internal use. This could explain, at least in part, 
why so many national regulators have expressed interest in devising a new sovereign currency … many nations 
recognise that should a credible major country issue a sovereign digital currency, it may offer considerable 
advantages over regular currency in the first-mentioned nation’s jurisdiction, and so the nation could rapidly 
face the loss of both monetary sovereignty and of the data associated with the use of the sovereign digital 
currency which will be collected by the issuing sovereign abroad, not the nation within which it is being used. 
Only time will tell the answer, but for now one question remains: which country will be the first to throw down 
the gauntlet in the sovereign digital currency battle?” Id.  
 77 See id.  
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skepticism.78 Central banks engaged in research to determine the potential 
effects on that specific country and its population have been the primary 
participants in the discussion of government-backed cryptocurrency.79 A few 
governments have taken the view that, while private cryptocurrencies may create 
issues, the market for such digital assets is “too small to [cause] sufficient 
concern [that] warrant[s] regulation and/or a ban at this juncture.”80  
The first official analysis to emerge from an international organization was 
an annual IMF Article IV81 consultation for the Marshall Islands, in September 
2018.82 The IMF report was relatively skeptical of the Marshall Island’s 
proposed cryptocurrency, the SOV.83 The IMF expressed concerns about the 
interaction between cryptocurrencies and AML/CFT regulations,84 concerns 
which would arise with any government-backed cryptocurrency should it look 
anything like Bitcoin.85 However, such concerns were amplified given the 
circumstances and regulatory concerns already present in the Marshall Islands.86 
Two months later, in November 2018, the IMF released a Staff Discussion 
Note entitled “Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currency,” thereby 
bringing oversight of government-backed cryptocurrency into the international 
 
 78 See, e.g., Rooney, supra note 33; Chen, supra note 32.  
 79 See, e.g., SVERIGES RIKSBANK, supra note 49. 
 80 GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 2; see also Kahn et al., supra note 13, 
at 1, 4; discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 81 An Article IV consultation stems from the requirement imposed on IMF member countries by Article 
IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. 4, adopted 
July 22, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement]; see also Surveillance, INT’L MONETARY 
FUND https://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (“Country surveillance is an 
ongoing process that culminates in regular (usually annual) comprehensive consultations with individual 
member countries, with discussions in between as needed. The consultations are known as ‘Article IV 
consultations’ because they are required by Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. During an Article IV 
consultation, an IMF team of economists visits a country to assess economic and financial developments and 
discuss the country’s economic and financial policies with government and central bank officials. IMF staff 
missions also often meet with parliamentarians and representatives of business, labor unions, and civil society.”). 
 82 Republic of the Marshall Islands, supra note 58. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id. 
 85 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Virtual Currencies—Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks, 1, 9 
(2014) [hereinafter FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Virtual Currencies]; see also PERKINS COIE, supra note 40 
(containing a chart showing actions by many national governments); Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 
530–32. 
 86 Republic of the Marshall Islands, supra note 58. The Marshall Islands is “a small and remote country 
… with a dispersed population,” with an economy highly dependent on external aid. Id. ¶ 1. Furthermore, the 
Marshall Islands already has an issue complying with U.S. Know Your Customer and anti-money laundering 
requirements for accounts denominated in U.S. dollars. Id. ¶ 10. As discussed later in this Comment, 
government-backed cryptocurrency presents due diligence issues, even for countries currently implementing 
high levels of due diligence. 
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conversation.87 The IMF analysis in this Staff Discussion Note was far more in-
depth than in the Marshall Islands’ Article IV Report. The analysis focused on 
possible Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) designs, as well as the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of government-backed cryptocurrency.88 While 
extremely insightful when compared to alternative works available at the time, 
this Staff Discussion Note explicitly “abstract[ed] from cross-border 
considerations by assuming that [government-backed cryptocurrency] is for 
domestic use only.”89 Limiting analysis within the domestic context is puzzling 
given the borderless characteristics of digital currencies, and is insufficient when 
measured against the dangers presented by cross-border transactions involving 
government-backed cryptocurrencies.  
The international community has exhibited a surprising lack of urgency in 
determining the potential consequences and reverberations stemming from 
widespread adoption of government-backed cryptocurrency.90 Exemplifying 
this insufficiently urgent attitude, the IMF Staff Discussion Note stated, 
“Overall, it is too early to draw firm conclusions on the net benefits of 
CBDC. Central banks should consider their specific country circumstances, 
paying careful attention to the risks and relative merits of alternative 
solutions. Further analysis of technological feasibility and operational costs 
is needed.”91 
The IMF’s attitude toward development of an international system of best 
practices, exemplified by the above quote, is not an isolated notion. In 2015, the 
European Central Bank advised that if virtual currencies became more connected 
to the real international economic system, the international community would 
need to more seriously undertake a comprehensive oversight framework.92 The 
time for issuing warnings has passed given the increased interest by government 
in introducing their own cryptocurrencies.93 The world must take decisive action 
 
 87 Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, at 6. The IMF was the first major international organization to 
address this issue head-on. Id. The organization did not release a substantive paper until November 2018; this 
first major international analysis of central bank digital currency only evaluated such currencies with respect to 
their domestic application, as opposed to analyzing the international effects. Id.  
 91 Id. at 5; see also id. at 31 (“Research on CBDC should proceed resolutely given that the questions to 
be explored are deep and difficult and have far-reaching implications.”). 
 92 ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 26 (“An increase in 
the usage of VCS is conceivable and thus surveillance of the take-up of VCS is important from a financial 
stability perspective. Transparency as regards the number, structure and scope of VCS appears key for 
monitoring such developments.”). 
 93 Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16, at 3 (resulting from the potential danger for large-scale instability 
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to coordinate development of a coherent, international oversight framework or 
system of best practices to deal with the potential consequences of government-
backed cryptocurrency. While it may not seem as though any one nation is close 
to introducing a legitimate government-backed cryptocurrency, the “Herding 
Effect,” lurks beneath the surface.94 The “Herding Effect,” in conjunction with 
the above-referenced warning issued by the European Central Bank, should 
further spur governments to undertake specific actions which may preempt 
issues of financial instability posed by government-backed cryptocurrencies. 
Given government-backed cryptocurrencies’ integration potential, and the 
subsequent issues that may arise, the international community must adopt some 
form of oversight or established best practices as soon as possible.95 While a 
country-by-country approach may allow for more freedom of choice for each 
individual government and eventually result in a sufficient level of concern,96 a 
single agency is much better equipped to tackle such pressing matters.97 
Furthermore, if a single agency is the force pushing countries to adopt a system 
of “best practices,” there will be the additional benefits conveyed by having a 
uniform approach to oversight across jurisdictions.98 A single agency must take 
the lead in creating and enforcing an international scheme of oversight relating 
to government-backed cryptocurrencies—at least as a starting point.  
Given the issues, discussed below in Part III.B, that private cryptocurrencies 
currently present to governments around the world, the lack of an urgent 
response to the dangers of government-backed cryptocurrencies should not 
come as a surprise. 99  
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST BE PRO-ACTIVE, DRAWING 
LESSONS FROM CURRENT EFFORTS TO REGULATE PRIVATE CRYPTOCURRENCY  
National governments have failed to address regulatory concerns 
surrounding private cryptocurrencies.100 Countries have opted to implement new 
regulatory schemes haphazardly, or to adapt existing regulatory schemes to 
 
within the international monetary system). 
 94 Id. at 52–53. 
 95 See supra Part II.B (discussing some of the ways in which the international monetary system might be 
destabilized). 
 96 Sufficient with respect to the size of the threat posed by the government-backed cryptocurrency space 
without oversight. 
 97 See infra Part V.B. 
 98 See infra Part III.D. 
 99 See infra Part II.C. 
 100 See Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16, at 3. 
GOLDSMITHPROOFS_3.25.20 3/25/2020 4:16 PM 
2020] IMF BEST PRACTICES 609 
private cryptocurrencies.101 And yet, while private cryptocurrencies such as 
Bitcoin have been discussed ad-nauseum,102 there is still no dominant approach 
to regulation.103  
A number of factors contribute to this lack of regulatory clarity. Part of this 
is attributable to the evolving nature of the space.104 Another part may be that 
existing laws often are not drafted with future technological advancements in 
mind.105 Thus, attempts to regulate innovative products or technologies are often 
unclear.106 Another significant factor contributing to the muddled regulatory 
environment for private cryptocurrencies is a result of the piece-meal approach 
taken by individual countries.107 However, the unique characteristics of private 
cryptocurrencies are the biggest contributing factor to this slow regulatory 
development.108 In an attempt to minimize the negative impact(s) which they 
perceive most harmful, states have taken a wide range of regulatory approaches. 
A. What are Private Cryptocurrencies, and Specifically, What is Bitcoin?  
Cryptocurrencies, both private and government-backed, represent a 
relatively new technology.109 Cryptocurrencies are decentralized, peer-to-peer 
virtual currencies operating on a cryptographic network.110 These coins are 
“digital representations of value and can be transferred, stored, and traded 
 
 101 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 296–306. 
 102 See generally supra note 11. 
 103 Compare Plassaras, supra note 11 (proposing regulation of Bitcoin under the IMF), with Howden, 
supra note 5, at 765 (rejecting regulation under the IMF and countering with WTO regulation) and Hughes & 
Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 530–32 (asserting that cryptocurrencies ought to be regulated as systems of 
payment).  
 104 Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 296. 
 105 Id. at 305. 
 106 Id. at 304–05. 
 107 This only makes sense; when a large number of intelligent people, from a variety of cultures and 
backgrounds, look at a problem, they will likely come up with various solutions to the problem. Lack of 
experience in the crypto space by regulators leads to experimentation in how the issues arising from cryptos are 
handled. Given the novelty of the technology, it will take time for the dominant regulatory scheme to emerge. 
 108 See infra Part III.B. 
 109 Kahn et al., supra note 13, at 2 (reasoning that while theorization of decentralized, private currency has 
been prevalent in Austrian School of Economics circles for many years, the technology blockchain and 
distributed ledger technology (DLT) and usage of such technology is a relatively recent development); See, e.g., 
Cole Peterson, Lack of Widespread Crypto Knowledge Could be Stunting the Market’s Growth, NEWSBTC (Dec. 
21, 2018), https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/12/21/lack-of-widespread-crypto-knowledge-could-be-stunting-the-
markets-growth/ (concluding that given the novelty of the technology itself, cryptocurrencies are a topic on 
which many people have only the most basic understanding). While this may prove to be sufficient for 
discussions at the workplace water-cooler, the substantive law of this Comment may prove more informative if 
the base technology of cryptocurrencies is explored at more than surface-level. 
 110 Tal Yellin et al., What is Bitcoin, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/infographic/technology/what-is-
bitcoin/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
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electronically.”111 Cryptocurrencies fall within the broader category of digital 
currencies,112 as illustrated by Figure 1 below. There are currently hundreds of 
cryptocurrencies in circulation, each with distinct characteristics and 
applications.113 The most popular and well-known of these cryptocurrencies is 
Bitcoin, while both Ethereum and XRP have seen relatively recent success.114 
       115 
As the most widespread and well-known cryptocurrency, a broad-strokes 
background of cryptocurrency necessarily begins with Bitcoin.116 In 2009, 
Satoshi Nakamoto released a whitepaper in which he detailed how his 
cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, had solved, via a decentralized network, the double-
spend problem previously encountered by virtual currencies.117 The double-
spend problem, was one of the main roadblocks to previous iterations of digital 
currency.118 Before Bitcoin, online transactions always required trusted third-
parties to facilitate, because:  
[w]ithout such intermediaries, digital money could be spent twice. Im-
agine there are no intermediaries with ledgers, and digital cash is 
simply a computer file, just as digital documents are computer files. 
 
 111 Lee et al., supra note 37. 
 112 IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations, IMF Staff Discussion Note, SDN/16/03, 
¶ 9 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter Virtual Currencies and Beyond]. 
 113 Coinmarket provides a listing of the most recognized cryptocurrencies. See All Cryptocurrencies, 
COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/ (last visited July 16, 2019) [hereinafter 
COINMARKETCAP].  
 114 See id. (listing of all cryptocurrencies sorted by market cap in USD from highest to lowest).  
 115 Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, ¶ 9. 
 116 See COINMARKETCAP, supra note 113.  
 117 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 1 (unpublished manuscript), 
available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
 118 See Nakamoto, supra note 117; see also Crosby, supra note 8, at 10; Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and 
Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/. 
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Alice could send $100 to Bob by attaching a money file to a message. 
But just as with email, sending an attachment does not remove it from 
one’s computer. Alice would retain a copy of the money file after she 
had sent it. She could then easily send the same $100 to Charlie.119  
The solution which Bitcoin implemented was to distribute,  
the necessary ledger among all the users of the system via a peer-to-
peer network. Every transaction that occurs in the bitcoin economy is 
registered in a public, distributed ledger, which is called the block 
chain. New transactions are checked against the block chain to ensure 
that the same bitcoins haven’t been previously spent, thus eliminating 
the double-spending problem.120 
This solution is one of the primary reasons that Bitcoin was considered a 
break-through for decentralized digital currency.121 From 2009 to early 2012, 
Bitcoin remained relatively unknown, its use primarily confined amongst a small 
number of internet users.122 However, between 2013 and 2014, Bitcoin (and 
other cryptocurrencies) came to the forefront via the Silk Road123 investigation 
and the Mt. Gox scandal.124 Since 2012, a number of agencies in countries such 
as the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, among others, have proposed a 
broad spectrum of regulatory schemes to help protect participants in the crypto-
 
 119 Brito, supra note 12, at 3.  
 120 Id. at 4. 
 121 Crosby, supra note 8 at 16 (concluding that without the adoption of this feature, Bitcoin would have 
been destined to fall victim to many of the same issues presented by previous attempts to create decentralized, 
digital money—the potential fraud arising from counterfeiting, that without a trusted third-party could not be 
reined in, thus rendering the “money” unreliable and ultimately useless); see also Brito, supra note 12, at 3 
(“Until Bitcoin’s invention in 2008 by the unidentified programmer known as Satoshi Nakamoto, online 
transactions always required a trusted third-party intermediary.”). 
 122 Brito, supra note 12, at 3; Grinberg, supra note 11, at 172–74 (stating that other users included early 
adopters, gold bugs, and those individuals who “believe that central banking institutions that have the authority 
to print more money, like the Federal Reserve, corrupt the economy and therefore they do not trust government-
backed fiat currencies (those unredeemable for commodities). Accordingly, these individuals prefer to hold their 
wealth and make exchanges in currencies backed by commodities—usually gold.”). 
 123 Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 126 (“Silk Road, an online black-market website, also takes advantage of 
bitcoin’s anonymity to sell mail-order illegal drugs and weapons. They made bitcoins the only form of payment 
on the website since other forms of payment, like PayPal or credit cards, can be traced or blocked.”). 
 124 Derek A. Dion, Note, I’ll Gladly Trade You Two Bites on Tuesday for a Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating 
Fraud in the E-conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 165, 185 (2013); Robert McMillan, 
The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www. 
wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/; see also Anita Ramasastry, Bitcoin: If You Can’t Ban It, Should You 
Regulate It? The Merits of Legalization, JUSTIA VERDICT (Feb. 25, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/ 
02/25/bitcoin-cant-ban-regulate#sthash.4oUpDzhi.dpuf. 
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asset space.125 However, no single approach garnered particularly widespread 
consensus on the international stage.126  
When Bitcoin began its slow rise in value starting in late 2013,127 it became 
apparent that governments would begin to take greater interest in regulating 
these coins.128 Some states took this a step further, raising the possibility of 
issuing, and regulating, their own cryptocurrencies, in an attempt to enter the 
digital currency space.129 As Bitcoin began to skyrocket in late 2017,130 so did 
government interest in the possibility of creating government-backed 
cryptocurrency.131  
This Comment will use academic and central bank studies, as well as various 
other literature surrounding Bitcoin to identify potential challenges posed by 
government-backed cryptocurrency.132 Lessons learned from attempts to 
regulate Bitcoin will subsequently be applied in order to propose viable solutions 
for dealing with the limitations of government-backed cryptocurrencies.  
B. What are The Characteristics of Private Cryptocurrencies? 
Cryptocurrencies in general, and Bitcoin in particular, have gained 
popularity over the last 5 years.133 The main advantages over traditional fiat 
currency134 can be grouped into four categories: (1) the ability to operate without 
 
 125 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938; Letter from Mary Jo White, to Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs (Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/ 
resources/documents/VCurrenty111813.pdf; US Dep’t of the Treasury, Financial Crimes and Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN), “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using 
Virtual Currencies” (Regulatory Guidance, FIN-2013-G001, US Dep’t of the Treasury, Washington, DC, March 
18, 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [hereinafter FinCEN]. 
 126 PERKINS COIE, supra note 40; see generally GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 
9, at 1. 
 127 See Fiorillo, supra note 10. 
 128 See e.g., FINCEN, supra note 125.  
 129 See supra Part II. 
 130 Fiorillo, supra note 10. 
 131 See supra Part II. 
 132 The discussion surrounding government-backed cryptocurrency is largely theoretical, consisting 
primarily of central bank studies and pilot programs. Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, at Intro. While 
government interest has increased greatly, the most widespread and most studied cryptocurrency is Bitcoin. See 
Michael Bordo & Andrew Levin, Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy 1 (Hoover 
Insitution Economics Working Paper No. 17104, Aug. 2017). 
 133 GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 1. 
 134 “Fiat money is any legal tender designated and issued by a central authority, such as the dollar or euro. 
It is similar to commodity-backed money in appearance, but radically different in concept, as it can no longer 
by redeemed for a commodity like gold. Users are willing to accept it in exchange for goods and services simply 
because they trust this central authority. Trust is therefore a crucial element of any fiat money system.” Plassaras, 
supra note 11, at 383 n. 25 (citing ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, supra note 55, at 9–10). 
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a trusted third-party;135 (2) lower transaction costs;136 (3) a secure “public 
ledger” (e.g., the blockchain technology underlying Bitcoin provides this 
security);137 and (4) pseudo-anonymity.138  
Some of these benefits are central to the idea of decentralized139 
cryptocurrencies,140 and would likely be diminished or eliminated entirely in 
creating a government-backed cryptocurrency.141 Other features—e.g., 
primarily the lower transaction costs and the secure “public ledger”—are 
benefits inherent to blockchain-based coins, meaning they would translate over 
to government-backed cryptocurrencies.142  
While private cryptocurrencies offer important advantages, they also have 
significant drawbacks. Some of the major problems associated with private 
cryptocurrencies are: (1) a lack of price stability;143 (2) a lack of inherent 
value;144 (3) security concerns with respect to storage of cryptocurrencies;145 (4) 
 
 135 Lee et al., supra note 37, at  
 136 Howden, supra note 5; see also, Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24 (discussing the potential benefits 
of digital currency, of which greater financial integration and lower transaction costs are two mentioned). 
 137 See Lee et al., supra note 37, at 2; see also Wiseman, supra note 11, at 8. 
 138 Lee et al., supra note 37, at 2. Some publications mistakenly describe Bitcoin as an anonymous 
payment system. See, e.g., Grinberg, supra note 11, at 204 (“Digital currencies are attractive vehicles for money 
laundering because they allow fast, anonymous, through-the-Internet transfers.”). Bitcoin is pseudo-anonymous 
because of the public and private key technology. For more information on Bitcoin’s usage of public and private 
keys, and the relationship of this technology with pseudo-anonymity of Bitcoin users, see generally Francois R. 
Velde, Bitcoin: A Primer, The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed Letter No. 317, at 2–3 (Dec. 
2013). 
 139 For purposes of this Comment, all private cryptocurrencies will be presumed decentralized, while 
government-backed cryptocurrencies will be presumed to be centralized. While potentially interesting and 
relevant, expanding the scope of this Comment to include such information would muddle all discussion. For 
further discussion of the nuance surrounding centralized and decentralized digital currencies, see generally 
Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24 at 7–9; Kahn et al., supra note 13. 
 140 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 12 at 15–16 (referencing security benefits [tangentially]). 
 141 One of the “benefits,” anonymity (or at least pseudo-anonymity), would almost certainly disappear. 
Bitcoin Exchange Guide News Team, Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC): Bank-Built Cryptocurrency?, 
BITCOIN EXCHANGE GUIDE (Aug. 31, 2018), https://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/central-bank-digital-currency-
cbdc/; see also, JP Koning, Fedcoin: A Central Bank-issued Cryptocurrency, R3 (Nov. 2016), https://www.r3. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/fedcoin_central-bank_R3.pdf. 
 142 Noelle Acheson, Why Use Bitcoin?, COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/information/why-use-
bitcoin/ (last updated Feb. 29, 2014). 
 143 Brito, supra note 12; see also, Lee, supra note 12; Berentsen & Schär, supra note 12, at 14.  
 144 Velde, supra note 138, at 2–3. 
 145 Brito, supra note 12, at 19. 
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the effect of pseudo-anonymity on criminal activity;146 and (5) the lack of 
developed consumer or merchant protections from fraudulent transactions.147  
One of the most unique characteristics of private cryptocurrencies is the 
ability to transfer coins across borders. The Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) aptly summarizes the concept: 
Cross Border Reach. Digital currencies based on distributed ledgers 
are basically open networks with a global scope. These schemes do not 
distinguish between users based on location, and therefore allow value 
to be transferred between users across borders. Moreover, the speed of 
a transaction is not conditional on the location of the payer and payee. 
Further, in the context of restrictions that may be placed on cross-bor-
der transactions by national authorities, the decentralized nature of 
these digital currency schemes means that it is difficult to impose such 
restrictions on transactions.148 
While this characteristic in and of itself is not a disadvantage, and some 
would argue it is an advantage, the “cross-border reach” of private 
cryptocurrencies can be a complicating factor in promulgating regulation.149 
Given the lack of real-world experience with government-backed 
cryptocurrencies, one way to predict their potential risks, and provide solutions 
to such risks, is to analyze the current regulatory schemes for private 
cryptocurrencies.  
C. Current Cryptocurrency Regulatory Schemes  
Private cryptocurrencies fall in what could best be described as a regulatory 
gray area.150 The technology associated with private cryptocurrencies is unique 
 
 146 Brito, supra note 12, at 20–22; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Virtual Currencies, supra note 85; see also, 
Ramasastry, supra note 124 (“Bitcoins, because they are not widely regulated or under government scrutiny, are 
used for illegal purposes.”). 
 147 See Grinberg, supra note 11, at 168–70 (“Bitcoin has no built-in anti-fraud capabilities, whereas 
companies like PayPal have invested millions of dollars in protecting customers against fraud.”). 
 148 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (BIS), COMMITTEE ON PAYMENTS AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, 
DIGITAL CURRENCIES, 1, 10 (Nov. 2015). 
 149 See ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 26. (“As and when 
these conditions are met to a larger extent, more direct regulatory responses might be required from a financial 
stability perspective. Moreover, regulatory responses are likely to be more effective if they are internationally 
coordinated. A patchwork of inconsistent national-level regulatory responses to financial stability concerns may 
not address risks—as the activity of agents in this market may be international.”); see also infra Part IV.D 
(discussing NYDFS). 
 150 Grinberg, supra note 11, at 182. See, for example, the tax law treatment of cryptocurrencies around the 
world. GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 2–3; see generally Goforth, supra note 
31, at 2. 
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and could not have been, nor was it, anticipated by lawmakers.151 Private 
cryptocurrencies exhibit traits of securities, systems of payment, commodities, 
and currencies,152 as well as the catch-all phrase “digital assets.”153 As a result, 
private cryptocurrencies, can be, and often are, placed into four different 
regulatory “buckets,” each of which is a different regulatory framework 
governing financial assets with different characteristics.154 
Consequently, there are at least four unique regulatory schemes which 
parallel the different “classifications.”155 These four regulatory schemes attempt 
to regulate private cryptocurrencies as: securities, a system of payment, 
commodities, and currency. A broad overview of these regulatory schemes, and 
the reasoning behind their application to Bitcoin/private cryptocurrencies, will 
provide important insight into a potentially workable framework for oversight 
of government-backed cryptocurrencies.156  
The current system of regulation differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and 
is an incoherent mess.157 The resulting “infrastructure” is destructive towards 
the currencies themselves, and dangerous for both individual users, as well as 
the societies in which such currency usage is prevalent.158 
1. Cryptocurrencies as Securities 
The first regulatory scheme treats private cryptocurrencies as securities.159 
While many of the early adopters of Bitcoin invested because they believed in 
the idea and the tech, they also saw it as an investment opportunity.160 Bitcoins, 
 
 151 Compare VoIP to cryptocurrencies. See Brito, supra note 12, at 23–24. 
 152 Brito, supra note 12, at 22–23. 
 153 Howden, supra note 5, at 767. 
 154 See generally, Goforth, supra note 31. 
 155 See generally, GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9. 
 156 For a more in-depth discussion of certain regulatory schemes, on a country-by-country basis, see GLOB. 
LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9. 
 157 Laura Shin, Crypto Industry Frustrated by Haphazard Regulation, N.Y, TIMES DEALBOOK (June 27, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/crypto-industry-regulation.html. 
 158 Id.; see generally, GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9 (providing a survey of 
the regulatory responses of 130 countries and illustrating the lack of consistency in, not only regulatory schemes, 
but even terminology). 
 159 This is the approach taken by the SEC, which treats Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) as investment 
contracts under the Howey test. See e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at 
*1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).  
 160 Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 14–15; see also, Grinberg, supra note 11, at 165; Joe Light, Should You 
Invest in Bitcoin, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 23, 2013, 10:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-you-invest-in-
bitcoin-1385161664; Bill Bambrough, Canadian Central Bank Bitcoin Survey Reveals Worrying Crypto Trends, 
FORBES (July 12, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2018/07/12/bitcoin-survey-
reveals-worrying-crypto-trends/#361c67422cf2.  
GOLDSMITHPROOFS_3.25.20 3/25/2020 4:16 PM 
616 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
as with most other private cryptocurrencies, are speculative investments and 
their usefulness does not extend beyond a small group of people looking to make 
passive gains via their investments.161  
In SEC v. W. J. Howey, the U.S. Supreme Court found that an investment 
contract has four parts.162 These four requirements are typically found in private 
cryptocurrencies and the early case law in the United States supported such a 
contention.163 This approach was mirrored by a number of other governments.164 
Under a regulatory system in which private cryptocurrencies are classified 
as securities, domestic authority would lie with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC),165 or a similar regulatory agency, such as the Canadian 
Securities Agency (CSA).166 This would provide a federal infrastructure for 
regulation of cryptocurrencies. However, this regulatory approach has been 
challenged by both academics167 and the courts,168 leading to speculation that 
certain cryptocurrencies, once usage is prevalent among a sufficiently large 
population, may no longer fall under the purview of securities regulators.169 
Alternatively, cryptocurrencies could be regulated on a state-by-state basis 
under the “Blue Sky” laws, or a comparable scheme abroad.170 The issue faced 
in a state-by-state regulatory regime is the cross-border reach of Bitcoin and 
other cryptocurrencies, which is only magnified at this level of intranational 
regulation.171 Private cryptocurrencies are able to maneuver across boundaries 
 
 161 See generally Bambrough, supra note 156. 
 162 SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (describing requirements for an investment 
contract).These four requirements are: (1) an investment of money; (2) a common enterprise; (3) an expectation 
of profits; and (4) profits derived from the efforts of others. Id. 
 163 Shavers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018, at *4–*6. 
 164 See, e.g., CSA Staff Notice 46-307—Cryptocurrency Offerings, SN 46-307/2017 (Can.), available at 
https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20170824_cryptocurrency-offerings.htm; Initial Coin Offers, 
FMA, https://www.fma.govt.nz/compliance/cryptocurrencies/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
 165 See, e.g., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 
The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 at 10–15 (July 25, 2017). 
 166 See GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 11. 
 167 See Kerry Lynn Macintosh, How to Encourage Global Electronic Commerce: The Case for Private 
Currencies On the Internet, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 733, 747 n.49 (1998); see also Grinberg, supra note 11, at 
196–99. 
 168 SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB(BLM), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200773, at *20 (S.D. Cal. 
Nov. 27, 2018).  
 169 William Hinman, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: 
Crypto (June 14, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418.  
 170 Blue Sky Laws, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/ 
answers-blueskyhtm.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2020). 
 171 See supra Part III.B (discussing the cross-border reach of cryptocurrency). 
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unlike any other financial instrument anticipated by current regulations.172 This 
method of regulating is likely to raise a number of questions and problems, 
which may confound users and regulators.173 Furthermore, this state-by-state 
approach does not address the haphazard results which may occur from differing 
regulatory schemes. 
The final, and most attractive, option under a securities regulatory scheme is 
regulation on an international scale. However, securities are not currently 
regulated on an international level and there is no entity with the clear capability 
or drive to undertake such a regulatory scheme.174 The closest institution to one 
which regulates securities on an international basis is the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision.175 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is “the 
primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks …. ”176 
However, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is not a binding legal 
authority and its decisions do not have legal force on their own, meaning the 
members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision are relied upon to 
enforce the decisions.177 While the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
provides a forum for different governments to discuss and address “regulatory 
and supervisory gaps that pose risks to financial stability,” the lack of binding 
authority, presents issues in coordinating the creation of an oversight 
framework, as countries will presumably be more resistant to outside forces—
which are essentially advisory boards—dictating their monetary policy.178 
2. Cryptocurrencies as a System of Payment  
There has been an interesting debate surrounding whether private 
cryptocurrencies fall under the category of “systems of payment.”179 Given the 
nature of cryptocurrencies, some experts have put forth the idea that an obvious 
way to regulate private cryptocurrencies is to treat them as payment system.180 
Other scholars, however, have argued that Bitcoin is clearly not a system of 
 
 172 Brito, supra note 12, at 22–23. 
 173 See Hughes & Middlebrook supra, note 39 at 540–41.  
 174 Howden, supra note 5, at 765. 
 175 Id. at 765–66; see also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision–Overview, BIS, http://www.bis.org/ 
bcbs/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) [hereinafter BIS, Digital Currencies].  
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. While the IMF is also not a “binding” authority, the historical importance of the IMF in maintaining 
the stability of the international monetary system for more than eighty years lends significant authority to its 
decisions. See infra note 237. 
 178 Basel Committee Charter, BIS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2020).  
 179 ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 17. 
 180 Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39. 
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payment, given that a bitcoin user may make a person-to-person transaction or 
a person-to-business transaction without requiring an intermediary or third party 
to verify the validity of the transaction.181  
Meanwhile, proponents argue that private cryptocurrencies are systems of 
payment which may operate free of a third-party. Further, such proponents 
stress, private cryptocurrencies function in a much more flexible manner than 
most other systems of payment.182 However, payment systems are subject to a 
number of different regulations around the world, most prominent of which are 
anti-money laundering laws (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism 
(CFT).183 Notwithstanding these concerns, some governments continue to 
classify cryptocurrencies as a means of payment.184 
While an in-depth dive of such regulations is outside the scope of this 
Comment, there is some basic information required before evaluating regulation 
of cryptocurrencies under this regulatory scheme. AML/CFT regulations vary 
by country,185 thus the Australian AML/CTF Act will serve as an example of 
such regulations. One of the main obligations placed upon reporting entities is 
Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements and verification of identity.186 This 
obligation’s purpose is to “ensure the reporting entity knows its customers and 
understands their customers’ financial activities.”187 These obligations are 
universal with respect to many national AML/CFT statutes188 and international 
standards.189  
 
 181 Id. at 518. 
 182 Id. at 539–42. 
 183 Id. at 517–22; see also FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION [hereinafter FIN. ACTION TASK 
FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS]. 
 184 See, e.g., GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing the few 
jurisdictions that allow cryptocurrencies to function as a means of payment, even by government agencies). 
 185 See generally Concepcion Verdugo Yepes, Compliance with the AML/CFT International Standard: 
Lessons from a Cross-Country Analysis (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/11/177, 2011). 
 186 See Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) pt 2 div 4 s 29 (Austl.); 
see also, Part B of an AML/CTF Program (Customer Due Diligence Procedures), AUSTRAC, http://www. 
austrac.gov.au/part-b-amlctf-program-customer-due-diligence-procedures (last updated July 1, 2019). 
 187 Part B of an AML/CTF Program (Customer Due Diligence Procedures), supra note 186. The 
Australian government requires that a reporting entity is “reasonably satisfied that: an individual customer is 
who they claim to be [and] a customer who is not an individual (such as a company, association, or trust) is a 
real entity and [they] know the details of its beneficial owners.” Id.  
 188 See, e.g., Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17 
amended by S.C. 2014, c C-31 (Can.). 
 189 The FATF is an intergovernmental agency which promotes international standards on combating 
money-laundering and the financing of terrorism. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, 
supra note 183. 
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Under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), the Department of the Treasury 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is the entity responsible for 
regulating systems of payment with operations in the United States.190 The BSA 
and its regulatory requirements were enacted by Congress primarily to “prevent 
illegal activity by requiring that regulated entities assist with the identification 
and investigation of suspicious transactions and customers.”191 The regulatory 
requirements of the BSA impose four main requirements on financial 
institutions: “(1) report[ing] suspicious transactions to law enforcement, (2) 
maintain[ing] records of large and/or suspicious transactions, (3) submit[ing] to 
compliance reviews of their anti-money laundering efforts, and (4) develop[ing] 
methods of identifying potentially dangerous customers.”192 
On the international level, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the 
primary entity responsible for oversight of AML/CFT and KYC obligations.193 
The FATF, founded in 1989 to combat money laundering, is an 
intergovernmental organization which monitors progress in implementing the 
FATF Recommendations through mutual evaluations of member countries.194  
There are two issues with regulating cryptocurrencies as a system of 
payment. The first issue is the KYC obligations outlined above, are antithetical 
to decentralized cryptocurrencies, particularly those which are “token-based.”195 
Many private cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are pseudo-anonymous, an 
appealing characteristics for many users.196 Not only could users abandon usage 
of compliant cryptocurrencies, but implementation of such KYC obligations 
would also be extremely difficult with private cryptocurrencies, given their 
nature.197 
The second issue with regulating cryptocurrencies as a system of payment is 
a question about who in the cryptocurrency network is required to meet such 
AML/CFT obligations.198 Bitcoin, and many other popular cryptocurrencies, are 
 
 190 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2012). 
 191 Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 322. 
 192 Id.  
 193 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 183, at 6.  
 194 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FORCE MANDATE (2012–2020) (Apr. 20, 2012).  
 195 Ariel Deschapell, Why Know-You-Customer Rules Won’t Work with Bitcoin, COINDESK (Apr. 13, 
2014), https://www.coindesk.com/know-customer-rules-wont-work-bitcoin; see also Kahn et al., supra note 13, 
at 3 (“Many of these new systems are ‘token-based’—that is, they rely on identification of the object being 
transferred as a means of payment rather than relying on identification of the individual whose account is being 
debited.”). 
 196 Brito, supra note 12, at 20–22; Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 297. 
 197 Id. at 328. 
 198 Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39 at 531. 
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unique in their decentralized nature.199 Arguably, the decentralized nature means 
that all members of the network are money services businesses (MSBs), and thus 
are all subject to these AML/CFT obligations.200  
However, such obligations require significant investment on the part of the 
MSB and imposing such an obligation upon every member of the Bitcoin 
network would effectively kill the feasibility of cryptocurrencies.201 FinCEN 
anticipated this problem in early 2013, releasing interpretive guidance “to clarify 
the applicability of the regulations … to persons creating, obtaining, distributing, 
exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies.”202 In this guidance 
memorandum, FinCEN stated that users “who obtain[] convertible virtual 
currency and use[] it to purchase real or virtual goods or services” are not 
MSBs.203 As a result, such users are generally not subject to FinCEN 
requirements.204 On the other hand, “Administrators” and “Exchangers” do 
qualify as MSBs and thus are subject to FinCEN regulations on AML and 
CFT.205  
3. Cryptocurrencies as Commodities 
Commodities are defined as a “basic good used in commerce that is 
interchangeable with other commodities of the same type.”206 One important 
aspect of commodities is that there is little difference “between a commodity 
coming from one producer and the same commodity coming from another 
producer.”207 Oftentimes, the word “commodity” brings to mind a raw material 
or agricultural product, which can be bought or sold at an exchange.208 Goods 
 
 199 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 200 Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39 at 521–23 (citing FinCEN, supra note 125).  
 201 Id. at 520, 558–59. 
 202 FinCEN, supra note 125. 
 203 Id. at 1–2. A user is a person that obtains virtual currency to purchase goods or services. Id. 
 204 Id. at 2; see also Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 322. 
 205 FinCEN, supra note 125; see also Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 531 (AML regulations 
promulgated by FinCEN “prescribe general risk-based assessment requirements for specific industries that the 
federal Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) governs and impose certain additional responsibility for maintaining customer-
identification programs and anti-money-laundering compliance programs for certain sub-industries otherwise 
identified as ‘financial institutions.’ FinCEN’s 2013 and 2014 Guidances brought operators of virtual-currency 
‘wallets’ and ‘exchanges’ into the scope of the term ‘money services’ and, accordingly, into the term ‘financial 
institutions’ for BSA purposes.”). 
 206 Commodity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodity.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 
2019).  
 207 Id. An example provided is that “[a] barrel of oil is basically the same product, regardless of the 
producer. By contrast, for electronics merchandise, the quality and features of a given product may be completely 
different depending on the producer.” Id. 
 208 Joshua Kennan, What Are Commodities and How Do You Trade Them?, THE BALANCE (June 29, 
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such as gold and silver fall under the commodity regulations given that they are 
“raw materials.”209 Bitcoin—as well as other cryptocurrencies—have often been 
compared to precious metals such as gold and silver, given the economic value 
of both.210 In recent years, the commodity regulators have had their 
responsibilities broadened to include a wide range of derivatives, futures, and 
swap contracts which extend far beyond raw materials and/or agricultural 
products.211 Thus, even if the comparison between cryptocurrencies and 
precious metals is unconvincing on its own, the expansion of commodity 
regulator power lends further credence to their regulation of cryptocurrencies. 
Regulation of commodities in the United States, as defined within the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), falls to the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC).212 Recently, the CFTC expanded its regulatory umbrella 
to include cryptocurrencies.213 Within the last few years, the CFTC has sought 
to define “virtual currencies,”214 referred to in this Comment as private 
cryptocurrencies, as a form of commodity within the CEA.215 Agencies in other 
 
2018), https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-commodities-356089.  
 209 Commodity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodity.asp (last visited Sept. 
27, 2019). 
 210 See Alec Liu, Why Bitcoins Are Just Like Gold, VICE (Mar. 21, 2013), http://motherboard.vice.com/ 
blog/why-bitcoins-are-just-like-gold; Howden, supra note 5, at 765. 
 211 See, e.g., Mission and Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, https://www. 
cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
 212 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 213 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Federal Court in New York Enters 
Preliminary Injunction Order Against Patrick K. McDonnell and His Company CabbageTech, Corp. d/b/a Coin 
Drop Markets in Connection with Fraudulent Virtual Currency Scheme (Mar. 6, 2018) (on file at https://www. 
cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7702-18).  
 214 The CFTC defines “virtual currency” as a digital representation of value that functions as a medium of 
exchange, a unit of account, or a store of value, but it does not have legal tender status. U.S. COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CUSTOMER ADVISORY: UNDERSTAND THE RISKS OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING 
(Dec. 2017), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@customerprotection/documents/file/ 
customeradvisory_urvct121517.pdf; see also In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15–29, 2015 WL 5535736 (Sept. 
17, 2015); CFTC v. McDonnell, No. 18-CV-361, 2018 WL 1175156, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018) (“A 
‘commodity’ encompasses virtual currency both in economic function and in the language of the statute.”). 
 215 CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 496–97 (D. Mass. 2018) (citations omitted) 
(“[CFTC] responds that ‘a “commodity” for purposes of [the CEA definition] is broader than any particular type 
or brand of that commodity.’ Pointing to the existence of Bitcoin futures contracts, it argues that contracts for 
future delivery of virtual currencies are dealt in and that My Big Coin, as a virtual currency, is therefore a 
commodity.”). 
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countries, such as Canada216 and China,217 have undertaken similar steps. In 
further support of the view that cryptocurrencies may be considered 
commodities, the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined in 
2014 that it would treat cryptocurrencies as commodities, and thus property, for 
purposes of taxation.218 When Bitcoin—or another cryptocurrency—is 
exchanged for a good or a service—as opposed to fiat currency—the transaction 
may constitute a barter exchange, particularly if that jurisdiction classifies 
cryptocurrencies as commodities, assets, or property.219  
On the international stage, such transactions would fall under the purview of 
two systems of regulation: the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)220 and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).221 The UCC functions as judicial reference 
helpful in settling disputes or litigation, but is not designed to proactively 
regulate cryptocurrencies without a centralized authority.222 As this Comment 
seeks to stress the need for a pro-active approach to developing a set of best 
practices, the UCC lacks the necessary preventative aspects. This is where the 
WTO enters the picture.  
The WTO is tasked with supervising the movement of goods and reducing 
obstacles to international trade.223 In addition, the WTO is responsible for 
“administering and monitoring the application of the WTO’s agreed rules for 
trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related intellectual property 
rights.”224 The WTO could take the position of the Canadian government, 
classifying the exchange of cryptocurrencies as “barter exchanges.”225 If so, the 
WTO would also be implying that cryptocurrencies are best classified as a 
 
 216 The Canada Revenue Service (CRA) “has characterized cryptocurrency as a commodity and not a 
government-issued currency. Accordingly, the use of cryptocurrency to pay for goods or services is ‘treated as 
a barter transaction.’” Mariam Al-Shikarchy et al., Canadian Taxation of Cryptocurrency… So Far, LEXOLOGY 
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6283077e-9d32-4531-81a5-56355fa54f47; 
see also GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 10–11. 
 217 GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., SELECTED JURISDICTIONS, supra note 42, at 6.  
 218 I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-1 C.B. 938. 
 219 See Al-Shikarchy, supra note 216 (“Accordingly, the use of cryptocurrency to pay for goods or services 
is ‘treated as a barter transaction.’”). 
 220 See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 520–22 (discussing the applicability of U.C.C. Article 
4A to regulation of cryptocurrencies). 
 221 See WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING WTO 9 (5th ed. 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf. 
 222 See Howden, supra note 5, at 765. 
 223 UNDERSTANDING WTO, supra note 222, at 9.  
 224 WORLD TRADE ORG., OVERVIEW, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e. 
htm; see id. 
 225 See Al-Shikarchy, supra note 216; Howden, supra note 5, at 763. 
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good.226 The WTO could thus regulate cryptocurrencies as the organization 
“designated with supervising and facilitating trade transactions … across 
borders.”227 However, one of the limitations of the WTO jurisdiction is that “the 
WTO serves as a forum where member governments can go to try to sort out 
any trade issues between one another.”228 Thus, the WTO, as a forum for 
governments, would not necessarily be able to address concerns of private 
cryptocurrency as they relate to individual users.229  
4. Cryptocurrencies as a Form of Currency 
Bitcoin and many other private cryptocurrencies share a number of 
characteristics with money or currency.230 Before evaluating whether private 
cryptocurrencies are money or currency, it is important to understand the 
definitions of each, as the terms are often confused.231 Money is a “mutually 
recognized representation of value.”232 Money acts as “(1) a medium of 
exchange, (2) a unit of account, and (3) a store of value.”233 Currency, has a 
similar definition, but importantly it is money “accepted by a government.”234 
Few countries have been willing to accept Bitcoin or other private 
cryptocurrencies as “currency.”235 However, one national government has 
already made the move to classify cryptocurrencies as a form of private 
currency.236 Just like fiat currencies, a major element of the popularity of Bitcoin 
and other cryptocurrencies is that it “is exactly like religion. It’s based entirely 
on faith.”237  
 
 226 Howden, supra note 5, at 763. 
 227 Id. at 764. 
 228 Id. at 781. 
 229 See generally id. 
 230 See id. at 762. 
 231 Compare Perkins, supra note 69, at 2 (differentiating between currency and money) and Currency, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/currency.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2019), with Grinberg, 
supra note 11 (seemingly mixing definitions of money and currency). Further complicating these similar terms 
is the addition of the term “legal tender.” See discussion, infra Part V.A. 
 232 Perkins, supra note 69, at 2. 
 233 Id. Money is evaluated on its ability to meet each of those functions. Id. (“To function as a medium of 
exchange, the thing must be tradable and agreed to have value. To function as unit of account, the thing must act 
as a good measurement system. To function as a store of value, the thing must be able to purchase approximately 
the same value of goods and services at some future date as it can purchase now.”). 
 234 Howden, supra note 5, at 762 (emphasis added). 
 235 See GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9 at 1–4. 
 236 Spaven, supra note 38; see also, O’Neal, supra note 50 (discussing Japan’s recognition of Bitcoin as 
currency or legal tender). 
 237 Matthew Yeomans, The Quest for a Global E-Currency, CNN (Sept. 28, 1999, 10:28 AM), http://www. 
cnn.com/TECH/computing/9909/28/global.e.currency.idg/index.html  
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No U.S. government agency currently regulates Bitcoin or any other 
cryptocurrency, as a form of currency. However, an attempt to regulate Bitcoin 
as a form of currency can be identified in Germany.238 Germany recognizes 
Bitcoin as a “private currency,” which only grants Bitcoin the status of a 
“financial instrument.”239 Thus, while Germany technically recognizes Bitcoin 
as a form of currency, it does not recognize Bitcoin or any other private 
cryptocurrency as a form of legal tender.240 
At the international level of currency “regulation,” the IMF is probably the 
most authoritative organization. The IMF was created following WWII to 
address problems created after the collapse of the gold standard.241 The 
organization was given a mandate to regain control over the international 
monetary and financial systems, so as to provide stability and predictability for 
all international actors and states.242 
While not officially a regulatory agency, the IMF is the closest thing to a 
regulatory agency of monetary policy on the international stage.243 The IMF is 
a cooperative fund which works with all 189-member countries, assessing their 
economic and currency policies, while providing suggestions and undertaking 
studies, so as to accomplish its mission.244 The primary goal of the IMF is to 
provide stability to the international monetary system.245 More specifically, one 
of the primary responsibilities of the IMF is to coordinate and maintain order in 
the international foreign exchange market.246  
The primary goal and responsibility of the IMF seems to parallel well with 
some of the issues presented by private cryptocurrency. There is just one 
 
 238 Spaven, supra note 38; see also, GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 40. 
 239 GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 40. 
 240 Id. at 40–41.  
 241 Plassaras, supra note 11, at 395.  
 242 Id. 
 243 Following the collapse of the gold standard in 1945, the IMF was responsible for coordinating and 
ensuring implementation of the Bretton Woods system. Id. In 1978, following the “Nixon shock” of 1971, the 
IMF amended its Articles of Agreement, permitting individual states more freedom to determine their exchange 
rates. Id. The system set out by the IMF in 1978 continues to govern the international foreign exchange market 
today. Plassaras, supra note 11, at 395; see also, JONATHAN E. SANFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CURRENCY 
MANIPULATION: THE IMF AND WTO, 1 (Jan. 28, 2011) (“The IMF is the leading international organization in 
the area of monetary policy.”). 
 244 What We Do, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/about/whatwedo.htm (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2019). 
 245 Id. 
 246 See IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 81, art. 1 (“The purposes of the International Monetary 
Fund are: … (iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, 
and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.”). 
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problem: the authority of the IMF is limited to countries which have signed onto 
the IMF Articles of Agreement. Private cryptocurrencies are, by their nature, 
separate from countries.247 Thus, while some commentators have tried, it is a 
stretch to argue that the IMF could extend their authority to include oversight of 
private cryptocurrencies. Moreover, even if the argument could be made in 
theoretical terms, the feasibility of exercising such oversight is extremely low. 
D. While There Exists a Regulatory Gray Area for Private Cryptocurrencies, 
It Is Clear that a Single Organization Must Take Charge 
While it is not clear how private cryptocurrencies might be regulated on a 
global level, it seems most likely that a regulatory framework would parallel the 
treatment of securities on the international stage.248 This regulatory scheme is 
essentially a collection of national systems, with no consistent regulatory 
requirements.249 If this were to be the regulatory structure which develops, it 
could pose significant issues for effective regulation of cryptocurrencies, given 
their cross-border reach.250 While not evaluating the overall effectiveness of this 
piece-meal approach to regulation, it is important to consider the potential 
limitations in considering how to best classify government-backed 
cryptocurrencies. In identifying the limitations of this country-by-country 
approach, it may be instructive to look to the smaller, but still parallel, example 
of New York State’s BitLicense regulatory scheme. 
In 2014, the most comprehensive private crypto regulations put forth by any 
state was the “BitLicense” regulatory scheme for cryptocurrency related 
businesses, proposed by the New York State Department of Financial Services 
(NYDFS).251 The scheme itself provides for a money-transmitter regulatory 
framework applied to cryptocurrency-market participants.252 While the NYDFS 
proposed regulatory scheme was monumental,253 it also further highlighted 
 
 247 See Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, ¶ 2 (“VCs [and thus, cryptocurrencies such as 
Bitcoin], in principle, question the paradigm of state-supported fiat currencies and the dominant role that central 
banks and conventional financial institutions have played in the operation of the financial system.”) For further 
discussion of the IMF see infra Part V. 
 248 See discussion supra Part III.C.1.  
 249 See id. 
 250 See COMMITTEE ON PAYMENTS AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, supra note 148.  
 251 Hughes, supra note 36, at 537. 
 252 Id. at 536–46 (discussing the specifics of the BitLicense regulatory scheme). 
 253 Id. at 537 (“Because it is the first comprehensive cryptocurrency-specific ‘money services’ licensing 
and regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies both in the United States and worldwide, the BitLicense is 
positioned to be the platform against which other cryptocurrency-specific ‘money services’ regulations are likely 
to be measured.”). 
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issues with piecemeal regulation as opposed to a more cohesive regulatory 
scheme.254  
Without the backing of a physical commodity, private cryptocurrencies are 
susceptible to rapid change in valuation, as their value is a reflection of what the 
market is willing to pay.255 Government-backed cryptocurrencies have the 
advantage of government support, which seems likely help to control the price 
volatility.256 While there are differences in how the two types of 
cryptocurrencies are regulated on an international scale, the interaction of 
private cryptocurrencies with currency-based regulations is instructive, allowing 
fact-supported predictions, as opposed to pure speculation.  
III. PRIVATE CRYPTOS VERSUS GOVERNMENT-BACKED CRYPTOS 
There are some characteristics which are likely to remain the same when 
comparing government-backed cryptocurrency to private cryptocurrencies. 
Some of the most important characteristics, which are inherent to digital 
currencies, are processing speeds and cross-border reach of such coins.257 
A. How and Why Do They Differ? 
In switching the discussion from private cryptocurrencies to government-
backed cryptocurrencies, one of the biggest doubts raised by the core adopters258 
of Bitcoin is the addition of a central authority.259 Government-backed 
 
 254 The primary issue highlighted was that “there is no failsafe way to determine where an internet user is 
located geographically. There is no way to guarantee that one’s internet traffic will not touch a server in New 
York … If there is no practical way for a virtual currency business to avoid engaging in activity that involves 
New York, there is no true limitation on New York’s jurisdictional reach.” Hughes, supra note 36, at 540–41; 
see also Shin, supra note 157. 
 255 See also Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 22; Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, 
¶ 13 (“The value of cryptocurrencies does not have any backing from any source. They derive value solely from 
the expectation that others would also value and use them.”). 
 256 See Koning, supra note 141, at 2 (“The removal of all central points of control over a currency has the 
effect of sacrificing price stability, since the absence of an independent entity to ‘back’ the bitcoins in circulation 
means that their price cannot be managed during periods of fluctuating demand …. Fedcoin is one solution to 
the volatility problem. It reintroduces one central point of control to the monetary system by granting a central 
bank the ability to set the supply of tokens on a Fedcoin blockchain.”). 
 257 COMMITTEE ON PAYMENTS AND MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES, supra note 148, at 4. 
 258 Specifically, those individuals who do not believe that a central authority, such as the Federal Reserve, 
should be able to control monetary policy to the degree that they are currently afforded. See Grinberg supra note 
11, at 172. 
 259 See Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, ¶ 2 (“VCs [and thus, cryptocurrencies such as 
Bitcoin], in principle, question the paradigm of state-supported fiat currencies and the dominant role that central 
banks and conventional financial institutions have played in the operation of the financial system.”). 
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cryptocurrencies will likely exist on a centralized network, as opposed to the 
decentralized, peer-to-peer network seen with private cryptocurrencies.260  
As a result of the centralization of any proposed government-backed 
cryptocurrency, such cryptocurrency is unlikely to be pseudo-anonymous.261 
Even if the government were to propose a cryptocurrency with similar 
characteristics to Bitcoin, with public and private keys, the centralization of the 
underlying blockchain network would almost certainly allow the government to 
eliminate any façade of pseudo-anonymity.262 At the same time, elimination of 
such pseudo-anonymity may help to mitigate the concerns surrounding use in 
connection with criminal activity.263  
Another issue which would potentially be addressed via government backing 
of a cryptocurrency is providing stability to the value of the coin.264 Private 
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have been associated with price volatility, 
partially derived from their lack of inherent value.265 In contrast, central bank 
actions may allow governments to address such volatility concerns in the context 
of government-backed cryptocurrencies.266  
Some of the primary concerns surrounding the related issues of price 
instability and lack of inherent value would seem to be addressed merely by the 
backing of a stable government.267 The truth is that concerns about price stability 
 
 260 Bank-Built Cryptocurrency?, supra note 141; see also, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Virtual Currencies, 
supra note 85, at 5; Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16, at 51–52; (“[T]he recent revisions to the Fifth AML 
Directive, which provides for additional AML checks for virtual currencies, indicate that states are unlikely to 
permit anonymous circulation of new units of digital currency”); but see Koning, supra note 141, at 28 (“Fedcoin 
could provide cash-like levels of anonymity and censorship-resistance.”). 
 261 Bank-Built Cryptocurrency?, supra note 141. 
 262 Kahn et al., supra note 13, at 16–18. 
 263 Id.; see also, Koning, supra note 141 (“Fedcoin could provide cash-like levels of anonymity and 
censorship- resistance, perhaps with a built-in mechanism that limits usage to small value payments so as to 
reduce participation by criminals and tax dodgers.”). 
 264 See Koning, supra note 141 (“The removal of all central points of control over a currency has the effect 
of sacrificing price stability, since the absence of an independent entity to ‘back’ the bitcoins in circulation means 
that their price cannot be managed during periods of fluctuating demand. This price volatility in turn cripples 
any appeal bitcoins might have to a broader audience. Fedcoin is one solution to the volatility problem. It 
reintroduces one central point of control to the monetary system by granting a central bank the ability to set the 
supply of tokens on a Fedcoin blockchain.”). 
 265 Plassaras, supra note 11, at 377; see also Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 22. 
 266 ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 1; accord., Doguet, 
supra note 65, at 1119. 
 267 Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, ¶ 13 (“Cryptocurrencies challenge the standard 
concept of fiat currencies. The value of existing fiat currencies is backed by the creditworthiness of the central 
bank and the government.”). However, while government guarantees may address some of the volatility issues 
with cryptocurrencies, such backing does not necessarily stabilize cryptocurrencies in the context of the larger 
monetary system. See Kahn et al., supra note 13, at 4 (“A central bank token would have to be designed 
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and stability of the international monetary system remain, even with the blessing 
of governments and their central banks.268  
At least one high profile banker, Swiss National Bank governing board 
member Andréa Maechler, has posited that government-backed 
cryptocurrencies still present the potential to inject instability into the global 
monetary system.269 Government-backed cryptocurrency has the potential to 
cause enormous issues for the international community, the most pressing of 
which is the threat to the stability of the international monetary system. 
As mentioned above, one of the major issues with private cryptocurrencies 
is a lack of stability, given the absence of inherent value in the coins.270 This 
lack of inherent value, mixed with speculation from investors and the relative 
uniqueness of the asset, have all contributed to price fluctuations which make 
private cryptocurrencies impractical for daily use by the average consumer.271 
Such impracticality would be unacceptable for government-backed 
cryptocurrency. As the IMF has discussed, central banks will prefer that 
government-backed cryptocurrencies support, or at least do not undermine, the 
public policy goals of financial integrity, financial stability, and monetary policy 
effectiveness.272  
While the government’s backing of a cryptocurrency may well stabilize the 
price of a cryptocurrency coin in the domestic scenario, the lack of any 
international oversight could cause instability to the international monetary 
system.273 Barring the adoption of a global oversight framework to address such 
potential instability presented by government-backed crypto, the problems 
arising from private cryptocurrencies will seem trivial.274  
 
appropriately to allay the risk of becoming a source of financial instability.”). 
 268 See id.  
 269 Rinecker, supra note 21; see also, BIS, BIS ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT, CRYPTOCURRENCIES: 
LOOKING BEYOND THE HYPE (June 24, 2018).  
 270 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 271 Koning, supra note 141, at 27–28 (“While Bitcoin shows some promise as a digital currency, its 
volatility makes it inaccessible to the majority of consumers.”). 
 272 Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 18. 
 273 Eur. Banking Auth., EBA Opinion on ‘Virtual Currencies,’ (July 4, 2014), https://www.eba.europa.eu/ 
documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf; see also Hughes & 
Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 514 (2015). 
 274 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
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B. What are the Major Issues Arising From these Differences? 
State governments must recognize the potential issues arising from the 
widespread adoption of government-backed cryptocurrencies.275 The biggest 
issues arising from differences between government-backed cryptocurrencies 
and private cryptocurrencies are related to: (1) potential instability posed by 
government-backed cryptocurrencies to the international monetary system,276 
and (2) uncertainty arising from the inconsistent treatment of such 
cryptocurrencies across differing jurisdictions.277  
Some of these issues also arise with private cryptocurrencies, such as 
Bitcoin.278 However, the key difference between private and government-
backed cryptocurrency is the extent to which a government-backed 
cryptocurrency might potentially be integrated within the global economy.279 A 
private cryptocurrency, at least in the current day and age, is likely too small to 
destabilize the entire international monetary system.280 But with government-
backed cryptocurrency, the effects of destabilizing events are magnified because 
of the order of financial inclusion possible with government-backed 
cryptocurrencies. 
National governments have not been quick or effective in their attempts to 
regulate private cryptocurrency.281 Furthermore, these governments have opted 
out of coordinating an effort to create a coherent framework for oversight or 
regulation of private cryptocurrency.  
There are certainly national governments and central banks that do recognize 
the potential issues stemming from widespread proliferation of private 
cryptocurrencies.282 As the Staff of the Global Legal Research Directorate noted 
in their comparative summary: 
One of the most common actions identified across the surveyed juris-
dictions is government-issued notices about the pitfalls of investing in 
the cryptocurrency markets. Such warnings, mostly issued by central 
 
 275 See CRYPTOASSETS TASKFORCE: FINAL REPORT, HM Treasury, Financial Conduct Authority, Bank of 
England (Oct. 2018); Deschapell, supra note 191. 
 276 Plassaras, supra note 11, at 377; see also Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶¶ 38–50 (discussing 
the extent to which government-backed digital currency could undermine financial stability). 
 277 See generally GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9.  
 278 Lee et al., supra note 37. 
 279 Lagarde, supra note 32. 
 280 See Andrea O’Sullivan, How Do Cryptocurrencies Affect Monetary Policy?, COIN CENTER (June 20, 
2018), https://coincenter.org/entry/how-do-cryptocurrencies-affect-monetary-policy. 
 281 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 282 GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9, at 1.  
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banks, are largely designed to educate the citizenry about the differ-
ence between actual currencies, which are issued and guaranteed by 
the state, and cryptocurrencies, which are not. Most government warn-
ings note the added risk resulting from the high volatility associated 
with cryptocurrencies and the fact that many of the organizations that 
facilitate such transactions are unregulated. Most also note that citizens 
who invest in cryptocurrencies do so at their own personal risk and 
that no legal recourse is available to them in the event of loss.283 
While there are a number of governments taking the above approach, there 
are other countries which believe that private cryptocurrencies are too small of 
a market and thus, “cannot jeopardize financial stability.”284 This belief that 
private cryptocurrencies are too small of a market to cause major concern could 
potentially be correct—one writer, using Bitcoin to draw a “rough sketch of the 
current state of the market [of cryptocurrencies],” estimates Bitcoin’s $100 
billion market capitalization constitutes approximately 0.11% of the world’s 
broad money supply.285 Government-backed cryptocurrency may well flip that 
conclusion on its head.286 Private cryptocurrency is still confined to a relatively 
small number of users, with one estimate from 2015 expecting the Bitcoin user-
base to consist of only 5 million active users worldwide.287 While private 
cryptocurrencies are investable assets, they are still not widely accepted. A 
government-backed digital currency could (or would, depending on the level of 
adoption government-backed cryptocurrencies might enjoy) be nearly 
equivalent to electronic cash and would be a part of the average citizen’s daily 
life.288 
Greater financial inclusion for members of society who historically have not 
had much access to the traditional financial system is an oft-cited reason for the 
 
 283 Id. The comparative summary goes on to discuss the potential use of private cryptocurrencies for 
criminal activity and fraud. Id.  
 284 ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, supra note 55, at 6. 
 285 O’Sullivan, supra note 281.  
 286 See Kahn et al., supra note 13, at 1, 4 (“A central bank move into digital tokens will have important 
effects on financial stability and competition. Today, private token-based forms of money, like cryptocurrencies, 
do not seem to be a major threat to financial stability because they are not widely used as means of payments or 
store of value. A central bank token would have to be designed appropriately to allay the risk of becoming a 
source of financial instability.”). 
 287 See Everett Rosenfeld, Bitcoin to Near 5M Active Users by 2019, Remain Niche: Study, CNBC (Mar. 
17, 2015, 6:20 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/17/bitcoin-to-near-5m-active-users-by-2019-remain-niche-
study.html (citing MORGANE KIMMICH, THE FUTURE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: BITCOIN & ALTCOIN IMPACT & 
OPPORTUNITIES 2015-2019 (2019)). 
 288 Lagarde, supra note 32 (discussing that part of the case for Central Bank Digital Currency is the 
potential for greater financial inclusion of people and businesses in remote and marginalized regions); see also 
Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 34; Id. at Table 2 (indicating that many countries considering the 
implementation of CBDC reason that it will lead to greater financial inclusion). 
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appeal of government-backed cryptocurrency.289 The potential for greater 
financial inclusion deriving from the widespread adoption of government-
backed cryptocurrency, illuminates one of the larger concerns surrounding 
government-backed cryptocurrency—that widespread adoption of these 
currencies may eventually create risks to financial stability.290 While 
governments may recognize the opportunity for financial inclusion, international 
community action demonstrates a failure to recognize the dangerous 
consequences that accompany such integration.  
IV. GOVERNMENT-BACKED CRYPTOCURRENCY IS EQUIVALENT TO LEGAL 
TENDER; IT IS URGENT THAT THE IMF COORDINATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 
OVERSIGHT FRAMEWORK  
Given the novelty of government-backed cryptocurrency, there is a dearth 
of regulation, as well as a lack of academic research on the topic of oversight. 
Thus, to make an educated guess as to how government-backed cryptocurrency 
might be classified, the review of current private cryptocurrency regulatory 
schemes provides a starting point for classification and regulation of 
government-backed cryptocurrency. Furthermore, the survey of these other 
regulatory schemes may provide a framework for potential future regulations 
governing other issues related to government-backed cryptocurrencies.  
A. Government-Backed Cryptocurrencies Are Currencies (Or Legal Tender) 
Currency is simply money that can be regularly used within an economy, 
frequently with the acceptance or backing of the government.291 This parallels 
often-times with the definition of legal tender.292 Legal tender is described as “a 
form of payment recognized by law that must be accepted by a creditor towards 
satisfaction of a debt or financial obligation.”293 No creditor is obligated to 
 
 289 See Lagarde, supra note 32 (“[D]igital currency offers great promise, through its ability to reach people 
and businesses in remote and marginalized regions. We know that banks are not exactly rushing to serve poor 
and rural populations.”); Brito, supra note 12, at 14–15.  
 290 See Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 4 (discussing the risks which VCs and similar technologies, 
such as cryptocurrencies, pose). 
 291 Howden, supra note 5, at 762 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 440 (9th ed. 2009); Currency, supra note 
232). 
 292 Id. 
 293 Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 276–78 (citing James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73, 
84 (1887)); see also Legal Tender, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/legal-tender.asp (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2019) (“Legal tender is any official medium of payment recognized by law that can be used to 
extinguish a public or private debt, or meet a financial obligation.”). 
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accept private cryptocurrencies; thus, denying such cryptocurrencies the status 
of legal tender.294 
Many of the proposed frameworks that were discussed in this Comment for 
creation or regulation of government-backed cryptocurrencies contemplate that 
such government-backed cryptocurrency would satisfy the above requirements 
of legal tender.295 These government-backed cryptocurrencies would be “a form 
of payment recognized by law” and would be widely accepted within the 
international economy. 296  
If government-backed cryptocurrency is given the status of legal tender, 
which seems likely given the information above, such designation would likely 
remove it from the purview of regulation over securities, commodities, and 
systems of payment.297 
Furthermore, while outside the bounds of this Comment, it seems relevant 
to note the parallels between the current transition from paper fiat currency to 
government-backed digital currency, and the historical transition from the gold 
standard to the current system of national fiat monies and flexible exchange 
rates.298  
 
 294 Id. at 278. 
 295 See, e.g., SVERIGES RIKSBANK, THE RIKSBANK’S E-KRONA PROJECT: ACTION PLAN FOR 2018 (Dec. 
2017), https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/e-krona/2017/handlingsplan_ekrona_171221_ 
eng.pdf; Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, the Riskbank’s e-krona project, the proposed “FedCoin,” and the 
IMF reporting “Casting Light on Digital Currency.” SVERIGES RIKSBANK, supra note 49, at 8; Koning, supra 
note 141; Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, 30. 
 296 Tu & Meredith, supra note 15, at 276–78 (citing James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73, 
84 (1887)). 
 297 Grinberg, supra note 11, at 200 (citing Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, What is a Security 
Under the Federal Securities Laws?, 56 ALB. L. REV. 473, 483 (1993) (“[I]t is generally acknowledged that 
currency is not a security.”); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1280 n.4 (S.D. 
Ohio 1996) (“foreign currency … is not a security as defined in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.”). The 1934 Act 
excludes from the definition of security “currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance 
which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any 
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10)). With 
respect to regulation as a system of payment, it seems that if private cryptocurrencies are unlikely to be classified 
as systems of payment, it is even more unlikely that government-backed cryptos would be classified as such. 
But see, Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 505 (2015) (suggesting that Bitcoin could be regulated as a 
system of payment entity). 
 298 Historically, much of the globe had a system of commodity money. Didenko & Buckley, supra note 
16. In this system, money could be exchanged at a bank for an equivalent amount of some commodity, usually 
gold, silver, or another previous metal. George Selgin, Synthetic Commodity Money, UNIV. OF GEORGIA, 1, 2 
(Apr. 10, 2013). During the 20th century, the United States, and the rest of the world, transitioned from the gold 
standard (a commodity money) to the Bretton Woods system (also a commodity money system), and finally, in 
1971, to the current, “post-Nixon Shock” era. Paul Krugman, The Gold Bug Variations, SLATE (Nov. 22, 1996). 
For further discussion, see Didenko & Buckley, supra note 16; Mancini-Griffoli et al., supra note 24, ¶ 4 
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While private cryptocurrencies currently exist in a gray zone of regulation,299 
government-backing of such coins will provide considerably more clarity as to 
the most appropriate regulatory classification.300 However, even though 
government-backed cryptocurrencies may more easily be classified than are 
private cryptocurrencies, these government-backed coins will still retain some 
of the characteristics which originally placed cryptocurrencies in a regulatory 
gray area.301 
B. Regulatory Efforts Moving Forward—Single Entity Oversight 
Cryptocurrencies, both government-backed and private, are unique in their 
ability to cross borders with ease.302 While the current patchwork system of 
regulation might address some problems presented by government-backed 
cryptocurrency (such as those issues related to fraud and potential criminal 
activity) the cross-border reach inherent in cryptocurrency (and digital currency, 
more generally) will require international cooperation.303 The characteristics of 
government-backed cryptocurrencies, at least as currently envisioned, are 
unique. However, at its core, government-backed cryptocurrency is analogous 
to paper, fiat currency. To address the possible instability presented by the 
widespread adoption of government-backed cryptocurrencies, the oversight 
scheme most likely to be successful is one that parallels the oversight framework 
currently in place governing fiat, paper currency.  
  
 
(“Several are actively investigating the possibility of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). This new central 
bank liability would be a widely accessible digital form of fiat money, intended as legal tender. One day, it could 
fully replace physical cash. CBDC seems to be a natural next step in the evolution of official coinage (from 
metal-based money, to metal-backed banknotes, to physical fiat money).”). 
 299 See generally Goforth, supra note 31. 
 300 See Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note 112, ¶ 19 (“The legal concept of currency is associated 
with the power of the sovereign to establish a legal framework providing for central issuance of banknotes and 
coins …. The legal concept of money is also based on the power of the state to regulate the monetary system.”). 
 301 Brito, supra note 12, at 22. Given the shifting regulatory environment for cryptocurrencies and those 
who engage in crypto-related businesses, there is a great deal of confusion as to how these innovative products 
may be used in a legal manner. See generally Goforth, supra note 31. 
 302 BIS, Digital Currencies, supra note 175. 
 303 ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 26 (“Moreover, 
regulatory responses are likely to be more effective if they are internationally coordinated. A patchwork of 
inconsistent national-level regulatory responses to financial stability concerns may not address risks—as the 
activity of agents in this market may be international.”). 
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C. Why the IMF Can, and Should, Rapidly Expand Its Foray into the 
Government-Backed Cryptocurrency Space  
The IMF was established following World War II with the following express 
purposes:  
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a perma-
nent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and col-
laboration on international monetary problems …. (iii) To promote ex-
change stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among 
members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. (iv) To as-
sist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect 
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of for-
eign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade …. 
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen 
the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments 
of members.304 
The IMF was, and is, tasked with ensuring the stability of the international 
monetary system.305 By signing the Articles of Agreement, states bind 
themselves to the IMF and as such, the IMF may impose obligations on 
signatories.306 The IMF imposes obligations on member countries via numerous 
articles in the IMF founding document, including Article IV307 and Article 
VIII.308 The most important obligation relating to potential concerns about an 
intentional injection of instability is that IMF member-states must, “avoid 
manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to 
prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair 
competitive advantage over other members.”309  
Two other IMF member-states obligations which would help to maintain 
stability in the international monetary system are a “commitment to pursue 
policies that are conducive to orderly economic growth and reasonable price 
stability, … and to provide the IMF with data about its economy.”310 To enforce 
these obligations and further its founding purpose, the IMF has a few 
mechanisms of power at its disposal. One of these powers, termed 
 
 304 IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 81, art. 1. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Obligations and Benefits of IMF Membership, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/exr/center/mm/eng/mm_bnfts.htm; see, e.g., Article IV consultations, further discussed infra n.78. 
 307 See generally IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 81, art. 4. 
 308 See generally id. art. 8. 
 309 Id. art. 4. 
 310 Surveillance, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/about/econsurv.htm (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2019). 
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“surveillance,”311 involves the IMF’s process of the regular monitoring of 
economies and associated provision of policy advice, which “is intended to 
identify weaknesses that are causing or could lead to financial or economic 
instability.”312 
One of the most important Articles with respect to the IMF and its capacity 
to implement oversight of government-backed cryptocurrency is Article IV.313 
Article IV, Section 5(a), mentions “separate currencies” and seems to grant “a 
means by which the IMF can exercise indirect control over currencies not 
formally within its reach.”314 Thus, even if a government does not consider its 
cryptocurrency to be an “official currency” of the country, the IMF may still 
exercise authority as it relates to oversight and/or best practices. 
Private cryptocurrencies are currently regulated on a country-by-country 
basis.315 However, this is not the ideal regulatory scheme for any form of 
cryptocurrency given the characteristics of the technology and the widespread 
risk posed by such characteristics.316  
1. The IMF Should Lead the Push for an International Oversight 
Framework  
The IMF, in pushing for an oversight framework, should focus on providing 
legitimacy to government-backed cryptocurrencies. Providing legitimacy to 
valid government-backed cryptocurrencies will supply the necessary consumer 
confidence in such currency markets. Consistent consumer confidence in the 
 
 311 Id. There are three types of surveillance undertaken by the IMF—Country Surveillance, Regional 
Surveillance, and Global Surveillance. Id. 
 312 Id. The IMF’s regular monitoring of economies and associated provision of policy advice is intended 
to identify weaknesses that are causing or could lead to financial or economic instability. Id. 
 313 See Plassaras, supra note 11, at 404 (quoting IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 81, art. 4) (“The 
precise meaning of these provisions—and the intent that motivates how they should operate—is unclear. Article 
IV, Section 5(a) mentions ‘separate currencies’ by referencing Article XXXI, Section 2, the provision under 
which signatories accede to the Article of Agreement …. Presumably, this suggests that the reference to ‘separate 
currencies’ in Article IV is meant to hold principal nation-states responsible for the currencies of their 
subsidiaries …. In essence, Article IV, Section 5’s reference to ‘separate currencies’ is best read as authorizing 
a means by which the IMF can exercise indirect control over currencies not formally within its reach.”). 
 314 Id. 
 315 See GLOB. LEGAL RES. CTR., AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 9. 
 316 See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 39, at 556–58 (2015) (discussing the ease with which 
cryptocurrencies can flow across borders, with at least a measure of pseudo-anonymity and highlighting failings 
identified in New York state’s attempt to regulate private cryptocurrencies on its own). Furthermore, the authors 
highlight potential jurisdictional issues with regulating cryptocurrencies which regularly cross borders. Id. at 
539–42; see also Shin, supra note 157; ECB, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES—A FURTHER ANALYSIS, supra 
note 14, at 26. 
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reliability of government-backed cryptocurrencies will help to provide stability 
to the currency markets. Given that the primary purpose of the IMF is to ensure 
the stability of the international monetary system, it would certainly be 
appropriate for the IMF to assert their authority here. If the IMF fails to assert 
its leadership in this arena, it could lead to instability within the international 
monetary system, a less consequential parallel of which can be seen in the 
unstable private cryptocurrency market. Proliferation of government-backed 
cryptocurrencies could potentially de-stabilize the entire international monetary 
system, as outlined throughout this Comment. 
For government-backed cryptocurrencies, the international oversight 
framework is most likely to emerge from consultations by and with the IMF. 
Government-backed cryptocurrencies share a number of characteristics with 
legal tender or currency as they currently exist.317 The IMF, given its historical 
importance in transitioning the world from the gold standard to the current 
system of paper fiat currency, has plenty of experience re-working their 
mechanisms to adapt to changing times and changing technology. This 
demonstrated experience will be invaluable should we continue transitioning 
towards digital currency. Further, as referenced frequently, there is a need for 
international consensus on how to deal with these government-backed 
cryptocurrencies, as regulation on a country-by-country basis simply cannot get 
the job done.  
2. Limits of IMF Oversight 
If the IMF takes the lead in developing an international oversight framework 
for government-backed cryptocurrency, it would be a significant step in the right 
direction. By taking the lead, the IMF can signal the urgency required to 
proactively address the issues highlighted here. However, an oversight 
framework centered around the IMF will not address all of the issues with 
government-backed crypto. Just as with paper fiat currency, there are State 
obligations and international organizations dedicated entirely to ensuring that 
AML/CFT guidelines are followed. Furthermore, there are domestic agencies 
which deal with fraudulent actors. And most importantly, any oversight 
framework involving the IMF will continue to rely on the actions of individual 
central banks around the globe to develop well-reasoned monetary policy in a 
 
 317 While money, currency, and legal tender are often used in common parlance as equal substitutes, there 
are some key differences. The primary difference for a currency is the wide acceptance of a medium of exchange, 
particularly acceptance by government actors. Howden, supra note 5, at 762 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 440 
(9th ed. 2009)); Currency, supra note 231. 
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manner which provides stability both domestically and (at least to a degree) 
internationally. Proposing that the IMF take the lead in developing an oversight 
framework for government-backed cryptos is merely the beginning of a long 
process, which will inevitably require many other actors in both the domestic 
and international spheres. 
CONCLUSION 
Cryptocurrencies have become one of the most talked about news subjects 
over the last few years. Questions about their benefits to society as a whole, as 
well as the potential dangers they present to both individuals and institutions 
have topped the list of many regulatory agencies, both within the United States 
and across the globe. This emerging technology has led to questioning of current 
regulatory regimes and whether the technology is too sophisticated to fit within 
already-existing regulatory regimes. Furthermore, given the many 
characteristics inherent in cryptocurrencies, states have varied greatly in their 
approaches to regulation.  
It may be awhile before the international community figures out how to 
regulate private cryptocurrencies, beyond the current piecemeal approach. 
However, along with the focus on private cryptocurrencies, there has been an 
increase in interest surrounding government-backed cryptocurrencies. These 
government-backed cryptocurrencies present many of the same questions that 
surround private cryptocurrencies, but at potentially greater economies of scale.  
Classification of private cryptocurrencies is a conundrum and only time will 
tell what regulatory scheme is most effective. Government-backed 
cryptocurrency, however, is relatively easy to classify as legal tender or a form 
of currency. Given the potential dangers of government-backed cryptocurrency, 
this is fortunate. Lacking, however, is an organization willing to step up and take 
the reins and push for oversight of government-backed cryptocurrencies, before 
they destabilize the international monetary system. Governments could wait for 
further developments in the government-backed cryptocurrency space, but given 
experiences with private cryptocurrency regulation, it would be more effective 
to take a proactive approach. Considering this need for proactivity, and looking 
within the international community, the organization best equipped to handle 
this challenge is the IMF. 
The IMF should work with individual countries and the international 
community as a whole to create an oversight framework (or at least a consensus 
system of best practices). This approach would include allowing the agency to 
GOLDSMITHPROOFS_3.25.20 3/25/2020 4:16 PM 
638 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
extend its monitoring and country surveillance programs over government-
backed cryptocurrencies. The controls the IMF places on these currencies do not 
need to be strict. Many scholars have voiced concern that over-regulation (or 
under-regulation for that matter) could substantially limit the potential of 
cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology in general.318  
If properly implemented (i.e., not over-bearing) and designed to enable the 
IMF to adjust rapidly to technological advancements, such an oversight 
framework ought to result in a much more globally appealing system of 
currency, even more so than paper (i.e., fiat) currency or private 
cryptocurrencies (which may still exist in a sort of regulatory gray area). 
However, as exemplified in the opening hypothetical, if the international 
community fails to create a cohesive oversight framework for government-
backed cryptocurrencies quickly, the consequences will be disastrous to the 




 318 See Perkins, supra note 69, at 21 (“Supporters of cryptocurrencies further argue that if the United States 
does not reduce the regulatory burdens involved in cryptocurrency exchanges, the country will be at a 
disadvantage relative to others in regard to the development of cryptocurrency systems and platforms.”); 
Kaplanov, supra note 11, at 173 (“Despite genuine concerns relating to bitcoins and criminal activity, this 
Comment argues against any prohibition by policymakers or judges that encounter bitcoins.”). 
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